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SUMMARY:
the

These curve-lined petns raise issues as to

government's

access

records

under

the

§2313(b}

and 41

u.s.c.

to

government

contractors'

access-to-records
§254(c}.

statutes,

In No.

10

business

u.s.c.

81-1273, the SG con-

tends that these access provisions give the Comptroller General
the authority to demand information about contractors' indirect
and unallocated costs (such as R & D and marketing costs} .
No.
that

81-14 72, Merck files
its

cost

records

In

a conditional cross petn contending

are

not

"directly

pert in en t"

to

its

fixed-price government contracts, and that the Comptroller General exceeded his limited audit authority by demanding private
company cost data for

individual congressmen and for the pur-

pose of conducting a general survey of drug industry economics.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: .

In four separate fixed-

priced contracts, Merck contracted with the DOD and the VA for
the sale of pharmaceuticals.
$2.8 million.

The contracts totaled more than

As required by statute, each contract contained

an access-to-records provision stating that the

u.s.

had "ac-

cess to and the right to examine any directly pertinent records
of the contractor
contract]."

• involving transactions related to [this

The

Merck's records.

Comptroller

General

requested

Merck refused to comply,

present action for

declaratory and

access

to

instead filing the

injunctive

relief against

the government.
The DC rejected Merck's argument that the government's
request was based on the assertedly improper purpose of survey-

3.

ing

the

pharmaceutical

industry

rather

than

the

concededly

proper purpose of assuring that the contract price was reasonable and appropriate.

The DC also rejected

Merck's argument

that the government's request exceeded statutory authority because no cost record could "directly pertain" to a contract in
which price was set by prior negotiation and agreement rather
than on a cost-plus basis.

The court, however, did restrict

the government's scope of access to Merck's cost records.

On

this issue, the DC denied the government access to Merck's indirect and unallocated costs of research and development, marketing, promotion, distribution, and administration.
Both

sides

appealed.

Pending

decision,

this

Court

V affirmed Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F.Supp. 1388 (SDNY
1977), aff'd 620 F.2d 17 (CA2
ed Court, 451
tation of

U.~.

aff'd by an equally divid-

(rejecting government's interpre-

access-to-records provisions)

participating).
majority

400 (1981)

1~0),

(Justice

Stewart not

/

The CADC then affirmed in a per curiam.

cited conflicting decisions

by

lower

courts on

The
the

issues presented and stated that the conflict "must be resolved
by the Supreme Court, not by us, and we believe that nothing
would be gained by a replowing of the field."
ing affirmed the DC "without more."
part.

The CADC accord-

Judge Mikva dissented in

His 28-page opinion concluded that "Congress intended to

give the Comptroller General exactly the sort of authority he
seeks to exert here."
SG'S CONTENTIONS

IN NO.

1273:

This case raises the

.
'

4.

same important issue that the Court considered but left unresolved last term in Staats v. Bristol Laboratories,
400

(1981) :

request

451

u.s.

the scope of ths Comptroller General's right to

records

from government contractors pursuant to con-

tractual provisions requiring the statute to be included in all
non-advertised government contracts in excess of $10,000.

The

CADC, CA2, and CA3 have disagreed with the CA7 on the proper
construction of

identical government contract language.

This

encourages forum shopping and could lead to a lack of cooperation

by contactors

in numerous

industries.

The

CADC' s

con-

struction erred in rejecting the GAO's longstanding interpretation of the access-to-records provision.

If allowed to stand,

the decision below will limit GAO's authority to inquire into
the appropriateness of contract prices and will hamper scrutiny
of significant unallocated costs.

This is a result Congress

never intended.
MERCK'S CONTENTIONS IN NO. 1273:

The conflicting CA

decisions have been spawned by a unique congressional attempt
to

use

the GAO's access-to-records authority.

The impact of

the decisions in these related cases is limited to a single set
of 7-year old demands.

Moreover, the conflict among the CAs is

more apparent than real because the CA7 has undermined its initial decision; when later confronted with the same issue, two
members of the panel concurred only because they felt bound by
the earlier decision.

See United States v.

ries, 597 F.2d 672, 674 (CA7 1979)

Abbott Laborato-

(Pell, J., concurring), 675

::>.

(Wood,

J.,

concurring).

The

other

three

CAs

that

have

ad-

dressed the issue have continued to reject the CA7 position.
If the CA7 again were presented with the issue, it is likely it
would realign itself with the other CAs.
generating

these decision were unique

motivated by a congressional inquiry.

The access demands

in that

they all were

It is unlikely that any

CA again ~ ill face the issue.

vf EG'S

REPLY IN NO. 1273:

Merck's argument that unique

demands generated the CA split obscures the fact that the issue
is one of statutory construction that could be implicated in
any

request

for

records

issued

by

the

Comptroller

General.

Merck's assertion of an "emerging consensus" rejecting the CA7
position is at odds with the opinion below, in which the majority of the CADC panel affirmed without engaging in any substantive reasoning about the merits of the controversy.
judge who did examine the issue

The one

Judge Mikva -- adhered to

the CA7 position.
DISCUSSION IN NO. 1273:

There is an undisputed con-

flict on an issue that was sufficiently important to prompt a
grant last year in Staats v. Bristol Laboratories, No. 80-264,
451

u.s.

400

(1981).

Merck's argument that the conflict

passing is belied by the split panel below.

is

Its argument that

the source of the conflict will never again occur seems speculative.

I would defer to the government's assertion that it

will repeat this type of investigation in the future if permitted to do so.

6.

MERCK'S

CONTENTIONS

IN

NO.

this Court's review of this case.

81-1472:

Merck

opposes

If cert is granted, however,

the Court should not confine its examination to the truncated
issue presented by

the

government.

Two closely

related

and

preliminary issues must be considered for the Court to resolve
the dispute presented by this case.
First,

cost records are not "directly pertinent"

to

the contracts involved in this case within the meaning of the
access statutes.

Unlike

the situation in cases of cost-plus

contracting, the government simply has no interests in Merck's
costs that "directly pertain to" or "involve transactions relating to" fixed price contracts.

Resolution of this point in

Merck's favor would preclude the need to reach the government's
issue of whether

indirect and unallocated costs are discover-

able.
Second, the Comptroller's access demand here was made
for a purpose not authorized by Congress.

The government has

explicitly disavowed suspicions that Merck has engaged in improprieties
The

and

legislative

any

interest

history of

in

these

were limited to these purposes.

auditing
access

Merck's contracts.
statutes

shows

they

Consequently the Comptroller

General has exceeded statutory authority by attempting to use
the access laws for the purpose of conducting a research study
on the economics of the entire pharmaceutical industry.

Reso-

lution of this point in Merck's favor also would avoid the need
to decide the question presented by the government's petition.

SG 1 S CONTENTIONS IN NO. 81-1472:

Last term the Court

refused to consider these issues in connection with Staats v.
Bristol Laboratories, 451 u.S.400
Staats, No.
CA

80-416,

judgment);

(same) •
time.

There

(1981).

449 u.s. 1038

SmithKline

Corp.

is no greater

See Merck

(1980)

v.

to

Co. v.

(denying cert before

Staats,

reason

&

No.

80-434,

review

them at

id.
this

Cross-petr 1 s arguments are without merit and have been

rejected by every CA that has considered them.
DISCUSSION IN NO. 81-1472:
cert before
extraordinary

judgment on these
action

does

not

Last term the Court denied

issues.

Failure to take

demonstrate

that

should not be reviewed in the ordinary course.

these

this

issues

In fact, Court

files suggest that, at Conference in Staats v. Bristol Laboratories,

-

Merck 1 s

Justices

Brennan,

White,

"directly pertinent"

Powell,

argument

and

Stevens

(presented

found

via Merck 1 s

a micus brief) to be highly relevant to resolution of the issue
now urged by the SG.
RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend granting both petitions.

There is a response.
03/29/82

Wiley

Opinion in petn in No. 81-1273
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

My Clerks

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Sept. 20, 1982

81-1273 Bowsher, Comptroller v. Merck & Co.
81-1472 Merck v. Bowsher
At least one of these cases - and possibly both present the same issue before us in Staats v. Bristol
Laboratories, in which we affirmed 620 F.2d 17 (CA2} by an
equally divided court, with Justice Stewart not
participating.

See 451

u.s.

400, decided in June 1981.

This is an important case involving an issue with
respect to the right of the government, where there has been
a negotiated contract with a supplier, to examine records
that in normal accounting parlance do not involve direct
costs of the product.

Several similar cases have been

decided in suits by or against pharmaceutical companies.
I believe this case is on the December argument
list.

Whichever clerk "draws it" could well start with my

file on the Staats case in which a bench memo was written.
Often such memos are extremely "bobtail" in the spring, and
my guess is that a supplementary memorandum will be
desirable.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

job 11/30/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 81-1273
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Bowsher, No. 81-1472
Questions Presented
(1) With respect to negotiated government contracts, does the
Comptroller General's statutory and contractual access-to-records
authority include access to records of costs that the contractor
does not allocate but that are defrayed by the contractor from
commingled general revenues that include the Government's payments
under the contract?
(2) Is the Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-torecords authority limited exclusively to cost-based contracts?
(3) Is the Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-torecords authority defeated by a claim that review of government
procurement methods is an unauthorized purpose for exercising such
authority?

'

~.

Background
In 1973, Merck entered into 3 contracts with the Defense Supply
Agency of the Department of Defense and 1 contract with the VA for
the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Government.

As required

by statute, each contract contained an access-to-records provision
granting the Comptroller access to "any directly pertinent" records
"involving transactions related to this contract."
§§2313(b); 41

See 10

u.s.c.

u.s.c. §254(c).

In 1971, Senator Nelson, chairman of a subcommittee
investigating the pharmaceutical industry, learned of the access-torecords provisions contained in certain government contracts and
urged that the General Accounting Office (GAO) invoke the
provisions: "I think that we ought to take a look at some of those
costs."

Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings on

Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry Before
the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small ___
Business, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 8020 (1971).

One oC~enator Nelson'

staff assistants, Ben Gordon, explicitly stated that specific cost
and price data should be secured by individual company and product,
and that "such data should be made public."

Gordon demanded on

behalf of Senator Nelson that the data be sought "through the courts
if necessary" and "without strings attached so that the information
as needed."

Similarly, a staff assistant to Senator

Kenned) , chairman of a Senate subcommittee on health,
1nsisted that the "only way" the objectives of Senator Kennedy's
subcommittee could be achieved was to "publicize specific price and
cost data for individual products."

J.

GAO finally concluded that it had "no viable alternative than
to press the companies for access to their cost data."

Initially,

however, GAO sought the voluntary participation of drug
manufactuers.

Its appeal was successful: Merck and five other

manufacturers voluntarily participated in the 1st phase of a
proposed 2-phase study.

In April 1974, GAO issued a proposal for

"Phase II," designed to "gather and develop the data necessary" to
make a "presentation concerning salient economic and operational
aspects of the industry."

The study was to cove l R&D J

manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and corporat \ overhead)

GAO

requested data relevant to all these aspects of the companies'
business for the period between 1964 and 1973.
Merck expressed reservations about giving GAO access to such
cost and pricing data without adequate guarantees of
confidentiality.

The Comptroller was prepared to give such

guarantees in the interests of completing the study.

Between April

and August of 1974, GAO representatives met with Senate staff to
seek their consent to the assurances of confidentiality.

GAO

emphasized that it would obtain "far more data" from voluntary
disclosure, obtained on the basis of guaranteed confidentiality,
"than we could demand under our statutory authority."

The staff

members were unpersuaded and refused to sanction any assurances of
confidentiality.
On August 26, 1974, abandoning the concept of a

~

~ ~
~

voluntary ~

study, the Comptroller issued formal demand letters, seeking access
to the records of the companies that had participated in the Phase I
study.

This step was taken with the approval of Senator Nelson.

....
~c

GAO was under no legal obligation to accede to the Senator's
demands,

~nds

...________....

had

respective subcommittees.

~t

been made formally by their

GAO's sole reason for abandoning its

~

~~
~~~ ~ ~

voluntary program and resorting to formal demands was the Senator's
refusal to approve any assurances of confidentiality.

/PI
!]}fityV

in

GAO had no reason to believe that any
)

had occurred

nection with the contracts, that any excess or unfair profits

been made, or that any violation of the law or other
irregularity had occurred.

All of the contracts selected by GAO for

demand letters were fixed-price procurements, with prices
established not by actual negotiation, but by reference either to
catalog

prices for ordinary commercial items sold in significant

quantities to the general public or to other evidence of a
competitive price.
Merck filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Comptroller lacked the authority to require the production of the
data demanded.

The suit was one of several challenges to the

Comptroller's authority to examine the records of pharmaceutical
companies pursuant to the access-to-records provisions.

The

Government counterclaimed for declaratory and injunctive relief to
compel Merck to comply with the Comptroller's demand.

The~

rejected Merck's arguments that the Comptroller's

request was based on the assertedly improper purpose of
"conduct [ ing] an economic survey of the pharmaceutical industry"
rather than the concededly proper purpose of ensur[ing] that the
prices [the Government] pays are reasonable and appropriate" and
that no cost records were subject to disclosure because "the

/)

-~---~

J.

contract prices were not cost based."

With respect to the scope of

access, however, the DC held that access should be limited to
records of mfg and delivery costs in accordance with the DC's
decision in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 620 F.2d 17 (CA2 1980), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981).

On this ground,

th~DC

denied

GAO access to all records of Merck's unallocated costs of reasearch
and development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and
administration.
A divided panel of

the~DC

affirmed the DC's judgment.

Judge

Mikva dissente

in part, concluding that "Congress intended to give

the

General exactly the sort of authority he seeks to

o~ptroller

exert here."

He stated that "[t]he test of 'directly pertinent'"--

the term that defines the scope of the Comptroller General's access
rights--is "whether [the] documents will assist the government to
determine whether its negotiating practices sufficiently protect it
from wasteful, fraudulent, or inefficient procurement practices."
Summaries of the Parties' Contentions
1.

SG.

In light of the language, legislative history, and

evident purpose of the access-to-records provisions, the Comptroller
must be allowed to examine all of the contractor's cost records that
are necessary and appropriate to determine whether the price charged
the government was "extravagan[t] ," "excessive," or "wasteful[]," 97
Cong. Rec. 13,198 (1951)

(remarks of Rep. Hardy).

Applying this

standard to the present case, it is clear that the Comptroller is
entitled to access to resp's cost records pertaining to R&D,
advertising and promotion, distribution and administration.

The

middle ground carved out by the CADC--permitting access to allocated
costs but not to unallocated costs--is an unsupportable limitation
on GAO's investigative authority that cannot be reconciled with the
intent of Congress.
The relevant provisions grant access to records of "all"
negotiated contracts, see 41 U.S.C. 254{c), and includes fixed-price
negotiated contracts.

Merck's contention to the contrary relies on

a myopic view of the legislative history.

The vast majority of the

comments make clear that, although the prevention of fraud was one
of the intended purposes of the provisions, other purposes--such as
those underlying the present request--were equally a part of
Congress' intent.
Merck's final argument, that the Comptroller's request for
records was motivated by an "improper" purpose, has been squarely
rejected by every court that has considered it.

The contention is

premised on a misreading of the facts and a misconception of the
study GAO proposes to conduct.

In any event, the courts below found

that GAO's purpose was proper and authorized by statute.
2.

Merck.

GAO's sweeping demand for access to Merck's records

conflicts with the express limiting language employed by Congress in
granting the Comptroller General the right to examine certain books
and records of government contractors.

GAO may only demand access

to records that {i) "directly pertain to" the contract and {ii)
"involve transactions relating to the contract."

The government's

contention that GAO has the right to examine all "costs defrayed
from commingled general revenues that include the government's

,

.

payments under the contract" cannot be reconciled with the language
of the access-to-records statutes.
TheCA erred in upholding the DC's judgment permitting GAO
access to records of Merck's direct production costs.

Application

of the words of limitation contained in the statute demonstrates
that no cost records are "directly pertinent" to the non-cost-based,
fixed-price contracts involved in this case.

Merck's production

costs were irrelevant to the formation or pricing of these
contracts, because the contracts were negotiated on the basis of the
catalog price at which Merck sold standard commercial items to the
public or on the basis of other evidence of adequate price
competition, rather than on the basis of cost data or estimates
submitted to the purchasing agency.
The CA also erred in permitting GAO access to any of Merck's
records because the Comptroller's demand for access to Merck's
records was not made for a congressionally authorized purpose.

The

record in this case establishes that the Comptroller issued his
August 1974 access-to-records demands to Merck and five other
pharmaceutical manufacturers in order to placate the desires of two
Senators and their staff aides to secure confidential drug company
cost data and to gather data for an economic study of the
pharmaceutical industry.

Congress did not authorize the Comptroller

to demand access to records of private companies for either of these
two purposes or for the pretext purpose of "assessing the adquacy of
procurement techniques."

A~

Discuss ion
I.

A.

Merck's Position.

0

_L-zs:1C.4 4

~~

Improper Purpose
The issue

G- A-

G whether

the GAO

excee~ed

its statutory authority by demanding access to confidential
financial records, at the instance of two Senators and their staff
aides, in order to furnish the Senators with individual company and
product data through the conduct of an economic survey of the
pharmaceutical industry.
B.

Assumptions Underlying the Argument.

Merck's arguments are

premised on the principle that an agency that is given power to
investigate for one purpose cannot use that power to pursue
distinctly different, unauthorized goals.
LaSalle National Bank, 437
subpoena power).

See United States v.

u.s. 298, 307, 316-317 n.l8 (1978) (IRS

It is an open question, however, whether the

contractual powers of GAO, a unique independent agency within the
legislative branch, should be subject to the same restraints as
those on the subpoena powers of administrative agencies.

See

Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts,
38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 349, 350 (1970)

(GAO operates "on the hazy

borderline between legislative and executive powers").

Cf. Case

Comment, The Comptroller General's Authority to Examine the Private
Business Records of Government Contractors: Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Staats, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1148 n.l (1979).
C.

Posture of Case.

Merck argues that the record clearly

demonstrates that GAO seeks access to its confidential business
records to undertake an economic study of the pharmaceutical
industry in response to intense and continuing pressure from two

4

~-~kl~~

Senators and their staff aides who wish to o ~f~
disclosure, cost and pricing
manufacturers.

data~~~
~1 -

- ~

specific products and

L--1--~~ .

Because the Court -is r\ viewing the CA's affirmance

of the DC's summary judgment, it must assume that Merck could prove
that GAO is seeking to obtain information for an industrywide
economic study that would provide Senators Nelson and Kennedy with
the information they sought.
D.

Conclusion.

The statutory requirement that the access-to-

records provision be included in the contracts establishes the
public interest in uncovering wastefulness and extravagance.

That

U.S. senators encourage and influence GAO to use its powers to the
fullest extent allowed by law, and that GAO heeds those senators, is

-----

irrelevant.

See Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency

Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 Yale L.J. 1360, 1368 {1980),
quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 {1972) {noting
that "members of Congress 'are constantly in touch with the
Executive Branch of Government--they may cajole, and exhort with
respect to the administration of a federal statute").

A demand

letter issued by GAO pursuant to its statutory authority, under the
continuing and intense pressure of U.S. senators, may not be
resisted on the ground that GAO sought the information for an
improper purpose.
162, 165 {1969)

See City of Chicago v. United States, 396

u.s.

{"Whether the Commission should make an

investigation ..• is of course within its discretion, a matter which
is not reviewable.").

I'

•

II.
A.

Cost-Based Contracts

Merck's Position.

Merck argues that cost data cannot be

"directly pertinent" to "transactions related to this contract"
where the price is fixed not in reference to a standard of fairness

_

in negotiating or to costs, but to catalog,
market, or competitive
...........
prices.
,

-

In support of this interpretation of §2313(b) and §254(c),

Merck points to limitations in the Truth-in-Negotiations Act, 10

u.s.c. §2306(f), and in the Renogotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C.
App. §1216(e), on the submission of cost data for the negotiation or
renegotiation of contracts based on established catalog prices or
adequate price competition.

Merck argues that these statutes and

the regulations promulgated thereunder provide important evidence
that similar restrictions are incorporated in §2313(b) and §254(c)
through the language limiting access to material "directly
pertinent" to "transactions relating to" the contract.

Merck

contends that, in the absence of convincing evidence that different
interpretations were intended, interrelated statutory provisions
should be given a harmonious construction.
B.

Rejection of Merck's Arguments.
J

<..

Both the statutory and the
. . . ~...

contractual provisions clearly apply by their terms to negotiated
contracts without qualification.

If Congress had desired to exclude

fixed-price contracts from the provisions' operation, it could have
explicitly done so, as it did in the Truth-in-Negotiations Act and
in the Renegotiation Act.

Moreover, Merck's contention that the

access-to-records provisions do not extend to costs conflicts
the language of the provisions.

w it~-,.-~

Not only has Merck contracted to~------~

disclose some "directly pertinent" records in its possession, but it

.l..l.o

has also contracted to put a provision in its subcontracts securing
access for GAO to the "directly pertinent" records of its
subcontractors.

If the position urged by Merck--that the statute

and the contract do not allow access to any cost records of fixedprice contracts--is correct, the provision for access to the records
of Merck and of its subcontractors would be a nullity.

The purpose

of the access-to-records provision is to allow GAO to assess the
reasonableness of the contractors' costs and pricing by insuring
full access by the Comptroller to all directly pertinent cost and
pricing records, including subcontractors' records that otherwise
might be unreachable because they would not be in the custody and
control of the contractor.

Thus, Merck's reading ignores a large

portion of the provision itself and violates the well-established
rule that a contract and a statute should be read so as to give
meaning to all their provisions.
C.

Conclusion.

L\

Cost records can be directly pertinent to

fixed-price contracts.
-----------------~

A.

Problem.

Rep. Har

_A

u

d the following examples to

illustrate the situations that his bill, which proposed the accessto-records provisions, was designed to reach:
It is common practice today to provide in a contract for
construction work a fixed overhead rate, either as a
proportion of direct labor costs or as a lump sum
amount ....
If in the course of checking the accounts of the
accountable officer, the GAO found a situation indicating
that the amount of overhead charged under the Government
contract was a great deal higher than the amount paid
under a private contract for the same work, it would then
obviously be desirable for the General Accounting Office
to look behind the rate which had been established ....

........
During the last war, there were cases where
contractors held both fixed-price and cost-plus-a-fixedfee contracts covering similar items or services, both
contracts being performed simultaneously and in the same
plant. In several cases it was found that the contractor
was charging to the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract
expenses which should have been charged to the fixed-price
contract. In that way he was being reimbursed for
expenses which should have been paid out of his own
pocket. Such a practice may, or may not, have been
intentional. But in any event, there would be little or
no chance of detecting such a practice, unless the General
Accounting Office has access to the contractors' books and
records.
97 Cong. Rec. 13,198 (1951).

For GAO to detect a differential

allocation of overhead costs between governmental and
nongovern~ s, ~ between cost-plus and fixed-price

--

--

contracts, it would have to examine a very broad set of
See Case Comment, supra, at 1157-1158 n.67.

rec ~ rds.

The implication of Rep.

Hardy's examples is that the legislation was i ntended to authorize
inquiry, not only into all costs associated with each negotiated
government procurement contract, but also into all similar contracts
between a particular contractor and his private buyers, in order to
determine whether the Government was bearing an excessive share of
the company's fixed costs.

It is clear, however, that Congress did

not intend the "directly pertinent" language to allow GAO to examine
records of costs recovered exclusively from nongovernmental
contracts.

See Memorandum on the Adequacy of the Legal Authority of

the General Accounting Office to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of
Profitability in Defense Contracting, reprinted at 115 Cong. Rec.
25,800 (1969)

(GAO has taken the position "that the words 'directly

pertinent' were intended only to limit GAO's right of access to
records pertaining to Government work as distinguished from nongovernment work").

B.

Legislative History.

The bill that contained §2313(b} and

§254(c} originally limited the Comptroller to "pertinent" records of
the contractor.

Rep. Hoffman emphasized in debates over the access-

to-records provisions that he objected strongly to "snooping
expeditions" and that the access-to-records provisions would allow
GAO "unlimited authority to go everywhere and snoop into everybody's
business."

97 Cong. Rec. 13,373 (1951}

(also stating opposition to

a statute that "would let GAO go into everybody's business and look
it over"}.

To prevent an expansive interpretation of the

provisions, Congress restricted the access proposal even further, by
specifying that only records "directly" pertinent to the contract
may be demanded.

Rep. Hoffman, who sponsored the limiting amendment

but opposed the original bill, see 97 Cong. Rec. 13,377 (1951},
stated specifically that the purpose of the modifying language was
to "limit the 'snooping' that may be carried on under this bill."
Id.

Rep. Hoffman emphasized that, unless the proposed bill was

limited, even a small government contract would open all of a
contractor's records to GAO inspection.

He pointed out that,

without amendment, the provisions would permit a contract for 10% of
a contractor's production to be inspected by GAO "not only with
reference to that one item of 10 percent ... but into all of his other
business where that same item was used."

Id.

He feared this result

because the contractor would inevitably fail to keep "a separate set
of books" for his government business, so that "every section of his
books will have to come under the complete scrutiny of the GAO.

He

is going to be harassed no end to try to break down production costs
and show the details ..•• "

Id., at 13,376 (remarks of Rep. Harvey).

... " t .

Although these statements were offered in support of a proposed
amendment relating to subcontractors, it is likely that the same
apprehension stimulated the introduction and adoption of the
"directly pertinent" language.
C.

Government's Position.

The Government argues that

Congress' addition of the word "directly" did not sharply narrow the
scope of inquiry to be allowed GAO.
1157-1158.

See Case Comment, supra, at

But see Note, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats: An Undue

Expansion of the GAO's Investigatory Power Under the Access-toRecords Statutes, 74 Nw. U.L. Rev. 122, 135 (1979).
Rep. Hardy did not oppose the amendment.
(1951).

It is true that

See 97 Cong. Rec. 13,377

It is also true that Rep. Hoffman did not indicate how his

change would affect GAO's ability to secure specific documents.
id.

See

On the other hand, a sponsor's statement of purpose generally

is regarded as a persuasive indicator of congressional intent.

See

FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976).
The legislative history manifests a strong congressional intent
to prevent unlimited "snooping."

When Congress enacts a statute

designed to limit governemnt intrusion in the private affairs of its
citizens, the statutory provisions should be followed scrupulously.
It is reasonable to conclude that the contracts here did not provide
for unlimited access to Merck's cost records.
D.

Cost Allocation in the Pharmaceutical Industry.

When cost

information is not allocated to specific contracts and their
products, the Government's argument that generalized cost data are
"directly pertinent" to any given contract is weakened.
supra, at 132.

See Note,

As do most manufacturing businesses, Merck divides

its costs into a small category of direct manufacturing costs that
can be readily assigned to a particular product and into other
categories of cost, including reasearch and development,
distribution, marketing, advertising, and administrative costs,
which are not assigned to any one product.

See Reekie, Price and

Quality Competition in the United States Drug Industry, 26 J. Indus.
Econ. 223, 235 (1978): Note, supra, at 132-133.

Cf. National

Association of Cost Accountants, Research Series No. 29, Accounting
for Reasearch and Development Costs, 36 N.A.C.A. Bull. 1375 14271430 (1955)

(survey finding that some businesses assign R&D costs to

particular products, but some do not because the arbitrary method of
allocation would not be helpful).

Merck maintains that this common

practice reflects the lack of generally accepted accounting
principles that permit accurate and meaningful allocation of these
indirect costs.
Obviously, however, these unassigned costs affect the price
charged for the company's products, because the company must recover
both the costs directly assigned and the unassigned pooled costs.
Mfg and distribution costs of individual pharmaceutical products may
constitute as little as 9% of the products' sale price.

See Rucker,

Public Policy Considerations in the Pricing of Prescription Drugs in
the United States, 4 Int'l J. Health Services 171, 173 (1974).

By

characterizing unallocated costs as "directly pertinent" to
government procurement contracts, GAO would be able to demand access
to all records of pooled costs whenever the price charged the
Government in the contracts at issue reflects costs attributable to

~u.

the pool.

GAO would thus have access to most, if not all, of

Merck's pricing data.
The Government, on the other hand, rejects both the argument
that there are no generally accepted accounting principles that
permit meaningful allocation of these indirect costs and Merck's
suggestion that GAO's interpretation of the access provision would
be without limits.

The Government argues that Merck itself

allocates costs to products and performs profitability studies for
its own

purposes~

even if allocation of indirect costs to products

cannot be made with scientific accuracy, it is helpful and
necessary.

The Government contends that there is almost no limit to

the allocation of costs to particular products other than that set
by expediency.

The Government maintains, however, that it will not

need certain information or information breakdowns, and thus that
its request for information is not without bounds.

In short, the

Government's contention is that any cost affecting the prices
charged the Government under a given contract may be "directly
pretinent" to the contract.
The Government's argument undermines its own position, for it
would seem that the Government's interpretation of "directly
pertinent" admits of no doctrinal limitation on its access powers."
The Government has not suggested a definition of "directly
pertinent" that preserves the distinction between snooping and
properly limited access.
effect in this case.

Indeed, its argument gives the phrase no

If a "directly pertinent" cost record means

any cost having a significant input into price, it would seem that
GAO could also justify an extensive investigation of subcontractors

.1.. I

who may actually be doing no Government business at all.

o

Cf.

Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to
Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1279,
1364-1365 (1973)

("The same argument that would justify a GAO audit

[similar to that requested here] would justify an audit of
contractors doing no government business at all.").
F.

GAO's Interpretation.

The Government contends that GAO's

administrative interpretation of "directly pertinent" should be
followed in the absence of compelling indications that it is wrong,
especially where those interpretations were reported to Congress.
Congress's inaction should not, however, be read as acquiescence.
See Girouard v. United States, 328

u.s.

61, 69 (1946).

GAO's broad

interpretation of the provisions is inconsistent with the
congressional intent and is entitled to no deference.

Cf. Note,

supra, at 135 n.77 ("The GAO itself has been uncertain about the
exact limits of its authority under the access-to-records
statutes.").

It is therefore necessary to find a more limited

interpretation consistent with the congressional history.
G.

Relevance of Other Industries.

In some industries, costs

such as R&D have such a small impact that they arguably are not
"directly pertinent" to the contract and its price.

Whether a cost

record is "directly pertinent" could vary from industry to industry.
In some industries, direct costs are the predominant component of a
product's price, and there would be no need to grant access to
indirect cost information of those firms.

But in the pharmaceutical

industry, R&D and other costs not immediatedly attributable to one
product form a large part of the costs of a pharmaceutical product.

~u.

Each case could be decided on its facts by addressing one question:
whether the records sought will show production costs and pricing of
the contracts sufficient to determine why the contract price was
fixed as it was and whether the contract may have been an
inappropriate means of meeting this particular procurement need of
the Government.

The judicial decision as to what records are

necessary would thus be essentially an accounting problem that is
not unlike those problems that are common in day-to-day discovery
involving corporations.
Congress probably did not intend for the interpretation of the
access-to-records provision to depend on the facts of each case.
The same provision appears in most Government contracts.

See Nash,

Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 693,
694 n.3 (1966)

(finding that only one quarter of all Government

procurement contracts are advertised (bidded, not fixed-price)
contracts).

Congress probably intended the words to acquire some

common meaning so that the Government and the contracting firm could
know within reason what they were contracting to perform.

In

contracts involving many millions of dollars, many firms, and many
products, certainty is more important than deciding each case on its
facts.
The Bristol DC equated the directly pertinent costs with
"manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging materials, labor
and fringe benefits, quality control and supervision); manufacturing
overhead (including plant administration, production planning,
warehousing, utilities, and security); royalty expenses; and
delivery costs."

428 F. Supp., at 1389.

Specifically excluded,

however, were data with respect to "research and development,
marketing and promotion, distribution and administration (except to
the extent that these areas may be included in the factors above)."
Id., at 1389-1390.

The CADC has adopted the standard formulated in

Bristol, which for the most part relies on the distinction between
direct and indirect costs.

It probably comports most closely with

Congress's intent to preclude GAO's scrutiny of nongovernmental
contracts.
H.

Problems with the Bristol Distinction.

Although disputes

the fact, it must be conceded that GAO may demand access to detect
wastefulness and may make certain studies to help it in its task.
Bristol's limiting interpretation of the access-to-records provision
may make it more difficult in some cases for GAO to obtain the
information it may need to uncover wastefulness.

In industries

where direct costs are the prime component of price, where firms are
producers of only one product, or where the firms sell almost
everything they make to the Government, Bristol will have little
limiting effect on GAO's ability to make various studies.

With

other firms, mfg cost information alone might be useful for two
purposes: (1) it might help to uncover

fraud~

and (2) where the

products are part of a competitive market, which most fixed-price
cost contracts, by definition, a comparison of direct cost
information could help the Government determine which company is
assigning more overhead to its product.

Nevertheless, it must be

acknowledged that Bristol will limit to varying degrees GAO's
ability to study any industry with firms that make several products
or have several buyers.

Moreover, economic studies based on such

I...Vo

restricted data may be of limited utility, and if the access
provisions were meant to equalize the relationship between the
Government and private contractors, Bristol fails to advance fully
that purpose in this case.
The difficulty, however, arises because {1) the statute
attempts to further the two conflicting congressional goals of

'---------------------

limiting "snooping" and permitting broad access; and {2) the
1...

,..-

pharmaceutical industry presents special characteristics.

The

conflict in goals appears on the face of the statute itself.

For

example, the fact that the demand is limited by the access-torecords provisions to data within three years of final payment, see
10 U.S.C. §2313{b), no doubt hampers the detection of wastefulness
and the usefulness of any studies that are prepared.

Congress also

restricted GAO's investigatory powers by not making the access-torecords provisions applicable to advertised as well as negotiable
contracts.

Information on producers doing no business with the

Government would undoubtedly also be useful in the overall
improvement of Government procurements, because the data could be
compared with the data collected from companies contracting with the
Government; but GAO cannot obtain that information under the
provisions.

See Morgan, supra, at 1364-1365.

The Court is not free

to ignore these limitations in trying to assure that GAO has
meaningful access to the contractor's records.
I.

Conclusion.

GAO has itself recognized its dilemma: "While

GAO's legal authority would permit it to perform some of the work
necessary in making a profit study ..• , to do a meaningful study of
profitability .•• , legislation should be enacted broadening its right

of access to records ..•. "

GAO Memorandum, supra, reprinted in 115

Cong. Rec. 25,801 (1969).

"In establishing the 'directly pertinent'

standard as a limitation on the GAO's access rights, Congress
apparently was willing to forego obtaining all the information that
might be related to a government contract if the only alternative
was to require a contractor to make available virtually all of its
records."

Note, supra, at 134-135 (footnote omitted).

If "directly

pertinent" information is not sufficient to make the Comptroller's
investigation of certain industries complete, or if certain
industries should be treated differently because of unique
circumstances, Congress, and not this Court, is better able to
decide which information GAO needs to fulfill Congress'
expectations.
Summary
1.

Merck must allow GAO personnel to inspect its records with

respect to manufacturing costs, manufacturing overhead, royalty
expenses, and delivery costs.

Merck need not produce data with

respect to R&D, marketing and promotion, distribution and
administration, except to the extent that these costs may be
included in the manufacturing costs.
2.

The Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-to-

records authority applies to fixed-cost contracts.
3.

The Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-to-

records authority may not be defeated by Merck's allegation that
review of government procurement methods is an unauthorized purpose
for exercising such authority.
4.

Affirm.

81-1273 BOWSHER V. MERCK & CO.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 81-1273

AND

81-1472

5~

CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
~
OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
~
PETITIONERS
81-1273
v.
)_p,
CJ I
MERCK & CO., INC.

'5"

MERCK & CO. , INC., PETITIONER
81-1472
v.
CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES AND
UNITED STATES

c_

~2-/2-f

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before the Court is the scope of the authority of
the Comptroller General of the United States to examine the
records of a private contractor with whom the Government
has entered into fixed-price 1 negotiated contracts. We
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'A pure fixed-price contract requires the contractor to furnish the goods
or services for a fixed amount of compensation regardless of the costs of
performance, thereby placing the risk of incurring unforeseen costs of performance on the contractor rather than the Government. See 1 R. Nash
andJ. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 413 (3d ed. 1977). Variations on
the pure fixed-price contract may contain some formula or technique for
adjusting the contract price to account for unforeseen cost elements. See
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conclude that, when the terms and conditions of the contract
are not expressly tied to the contractor's costs and the contractor makes no representations regarding its costs during
the course of negotiations, none of the contractor's cost
records is subject to inspection by the Comptroller Genelil.

---

I

In 1973 Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") entered into three
contracts with the Defense Supply Agency of the Department of Defense and one contract with the Veterans Administration for the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Government. All four contracts 'X_ere negotiated, rather than
awarded after formal advertising. 2 "'t'he'"' pharmaceutical
products supplied under each contract were standard commercial products sold by Merck in substantial quantffi"es to
thegeneral public. App. 41a. The price term proposed by
Merck for each contract was based on the catalog price at
which Merck sold the item to the general public or was otherwise determined by adequate competition. Before the
award of each of the contracts at the fixed-price proposed by
Merck, there was no actual negotiation of rice. The government contracting officers id not request Merck to submit
cost data in connection with any of the four contracts. In
short, the contract price wa§ nQ.t rel.~d to Merck's costs of
R[OductiQ.D.or performance under the contract, and Merck
rna~ during negotiations regardiiigifs
costs.
fixed-price incentive con
,
· redetenninable contract).
2
The Government
ploys two methods of procurement: advertised
procurement, i. e., fo a! solicitation of
petitive bids, and procureon ract is the method authorized by
ment by negotiation.
·
statute for use in situations in which the fonnal advertising and bidding
procedure is deemed impractical or unnecessary. See 10 U. S. C.
§ 2304(a); 41 U. S. C. § 252(c). In procuring by negotiation, the government agency discusses the tenns of the procurement with one or more contractors and awards the contract to the party offering the tenns most
advantageous to the Government.
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As required by 10 U.S. C. §2313(b) and 41 U.S. C.
§ 254(c),a each contract contained a standard access-torecords clause granting the Comptroller General the right to
examine any directly pertinent records involving transactions related to the contract. Relying on these clauses, in
August 1974 the Comptroller General issued a formal demand
to Merck for access to the following:
"all books, documents, papers, and other records directly pertinent to the contracts, which include, but are
not limited to (1) records of experienced costs of direct
materials, direct labor, overhead, and other pertinent
corporate costs, (2) support for prices charged to the
Government, and (3) such other information as may be
necessary for use to review the reasonableness of the
contract prices and the adequacy of the protection afforded the Government's interests." App. 18a. 4
10 U. S. C. § 2313(b), which applies to the Defense Supply Agency
contracts, provides;
"Except as provided in subsection (c), each contract negotiated under
this chapter shall provide that the Comptroller General and his representatives are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final payment,
to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or
any of his subcontractors, ~ectly pertain to and involve transactions
•
relating to, the contract or subcontract."
The Veterans Administration contract is governed by 41 U. S. C. § 254(c),
which provides in pertinent part:
"All contracts negotiated without advertising shall include a clause to the
effect that the Comptrorrer General of the United States ... shall until the
expiration of three years after final payment have access to and the right to
examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of
the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of
and involving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts."
Despite the slight difference in wording, there is no substantive difference
between the defense and civilian procurement statutes.
'The Comptroller General issued identical demands to five other
pharmaceutical companies. These access-to-records demands apparently
were the product of congressional interest in competition and profits in the
pharmaceutical industry generally.
3
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Merck refused to comply with the Comptroller General's request and commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Comptroller General's access demand
exceeded his statutory authority. 5 The United States interAs early as 1971, Senator Gaylord Nelson suggested during hearings on
competition in the drug industry that the Comptroller General invoke his
access-to-records authority "to take a look" at the costs incurred by
pharmaceutical companies. Hearings on Competitive Problems in the
Drug Industry Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8020 (1971). Following those hearings, Senator Nelson's staff continued to urge the General
Accounting Office (GAO) to use the access provisions to obtain cost records
"without any strings attached so that the high profits could be publicized
by product and firm." App. 144a; id., at 142a-148a. See also Hearings,
supra, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 8537, 8581-8583 (1972).
Finally in June 1973, the GAO responded by proposing a two-phase
study of the economics of the pharmaceutical industry to be accomplished
through voluntary participation by drug companies. Merck and five other
companies agreed to cooperate in the first phase, which contemplated gathering background data on the industry. In April1974, the GAO issued a
proposal for the second phase of the study, aimed at developing data on
"salient economic and operational aspects of the industry." App. 141a.
Merck expressed its concern over participating in this phase without adequate assurance of the confidentiality of the cost data it might be requested
to supply.
Initially the GAO agreed that the data regarding individual companies
and individual drug products should remain confidential and anonymous.
/d., at 150a. Senators Nelson and Kennedy and their staffs, however, reiterated that the subcommittee's objectives could be served only by publication of the data. Ibid. The Comptroller General's formal demand letters to the six companies that had participated voluntarily in the Phase I
study followed.
5
Four of the remaining five pharmaceutical companies that received
demand letters also challenged the Comptroller General's request. See
SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos.
81-2082, 81-2268; Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Staats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980) (per curiam), affd by an equally divided
Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981); United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597
F. 2d 672 (CA71979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904 (CA7), cert.
denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978).
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vened and counterclaimed to enforce the Comptroller General's demand.
The Distr~t Court granted ~rtial su~ jud_gment for
each party. ReJecting MerCk~ argument that cost records
are not "directly pertinent" to the fixed-price contracts that
were the predicate of the GAO demand, the court permitted
access to all records
"directly pertaining to the pricing and cost of producing
items furnished by . . . Merck under the . . . contracts
... , including manufacturing costs (including raw and
packaging materials, labor and fringe benefits, quality
control and supervision), manufacturing overhead (including plant administration, production planning,
warehousing, utilities and security), royalty expenses,
and delivery costs." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
81-1273, p. 39a.

./).L

The court barred access, however, to records "with respect)
to research and development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration." I d., at 40a. In a brief per
curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the (
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 665 F. 2d 1236 (1981).
/..\
Both parties sought certiorari. In No. 81-1273, the
United States petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals'
determination that records of Merck's indirect costs are not
subject to examination by the Comptroller General. In No.
81-1472, Merck challenges the determination that records of
its direct costs are "directly pertinent" to the contracts in
question and are therefore subject to examination. We
granted certiorari on the petitions of both parties.
U. S. - - (1982). We now affirm in part and reverse in
part.
II
In resolving the issues of statutory construction presented
by the parties, 6 we "'must begin with the language of the
6

The parties agree that the scope of the Comptroller General's author-
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statute itself."' Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC,
455 U. S. 577, - - (1982), quoting Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187 (1980). Congress
chose t'!o significant ..Ehrases of limit~n to describe the
class of recoras to which access is permitted under 10
S.C. §2313(b) and 41 U.S. C. §254(c); the records must
directly pertain to the contract and (2) involve transac~s relating to the contract. These descriptive phrases
employ "WOrds of relation-i. e., they refer to and derive
meaning from the particular factual circumstances surrounding the contract at issue. Thus, the nature of the contract
serves as a significant limitation on the Comptroller General's
access authority. Moreover, the pl:!!ase "directly pertinent"
limits that authority by requiring a close c·onnecbon between
the type of records sought and the nature of the underlying
contract.
The egislative history o e access provisions underscores
what the
e ects: the intention of Congress to limit
to some degree the Comptroller General's access powers.
As originally introduced, the bill now codified as 10 U. S. C.
§ 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c) provided access to "pertinent" records "involving transactions related to" the contract. See 97 Cong. Rec. 13371 (1951). 7 Representative
ity under the access-to-records clauses in the four contracts turns on the
meaning of the statutory language, rather than on the intention of the parties to the contract. We also emphasize at the outset that Merck does not
challenge the authority of Congress to impose, as a condition of doing business with the Government, a requirement that contractors disclose all of
their cost records to the Comptroller General, regardless of the pertinence
of these records to the particular contract. Rather, Merck bases its arguments on its interpretation of the statutory language.
7
This bill was modeled on, and as originally proposed was identical to, a
January 1951 amendment to the First War Powers Act of 1941. See Act
of January 12, 1951, 64 Stat. 1257. That amendment, a piece of emergency legislation adopted in response to the crisis conditions created by the
Korean War, was designed explicitly to detect fraudulent or other improper conduct. Because of severe wartime inflation, many defense con-

7
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Hoffman opposed the original bill on the ground that it permitted "unnecessary snooping expeditions" and allowed the
GAO to "go into everybody's business and look it over if they
just wanted to take a look at it." I d., at 13373. He therefore offered a floor amendment to insert the word "directly"
before the word "pertinent," stating that the purpose of the
amendment "is to limit the 'snooping' that may be carried on
under this bill." I d., at 13377. The sponsor of the original
bill, Representative Hardy, did not oppose the amendment,
and the amendment passed without debate or discussion.
The passage of the Hoffman amendment clearly reveals
that Congress did not wa.!_lt .!J.@"e_;;tricted "sn9.2£ing" by the
Comptroller General into the business records of a private
contractor. The Government nevertheless attempts to discount the significance of Congress' addition of the word "directly." Based on the lack of opposition to the limiting
amendment by the bill's sponsor and the lack of debate, the
tractors holding fixed-priced contracts could not meet their obligations.
To alleviate the problem, Congress gave President Truman emergency authority to renegotiate government contracts. See H. R. Rep. No. 3227,
81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1950). The access-to-records provisions were
included in order to deter fraud and profiteering in the renegotiation process. 96 Cong. Rec. 17123 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("The amendment will give power to the General Accounting Office to go into the books
and delve into the records of these contractors who have been relieved to
determine whether or not there is fraud or overreaching or whether they
have done anything untoward.").
Although the initial access-to-records legislation in the January 1951
amendments was of limited duration, Congress shortly thereafter passed
the permanent version at issue here. Representative Hardy, the sponsor
of both the temporary and permanent access-to-records provisions, learned
that government procurement officers were negotiating contract modifications under two permanent procurement statutes that lacked access provisions, the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. "In order to plug this
loophole," Representative Hardy introduced the bill to require inclusion of
access-to-records clauses in contracts negotiated under these statutes. 97
Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy).

81-1273 & 81-1472-0PINION

8

BOWSHER v. MERCK & .CO.

Government argues that the Hoffman modification did not
significantly alter the scope of the Hardy bill. We cannot
agree. The only explanation in the legislative history of the
meaning and purpose of the amendment is that of Representative Hoffman. His statement, which, as the explanation of
the sponsor of the language, is an "authoritative guide to the
statute's construction," North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell, 456 U. S. 512, - - (1982), expressly indicates that the
intent of the amendment was to curtail the scope of investigation authorized under the bill. Although, as the Government
emphasizes, Representative Hoffman did not have the votes
to defeat the bill, he nevertheless had the votes to circumscribe the inquiry that the Comptroller General was authorized to undertake. Moreover, to accept the Government's
contention that the amendment had no substantive effect
would contradict the settled principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every word of the
statute. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De
La Cuesta, 458 U.S.--,-- (1982).
In sum, the c~anguage of the statute and the legislativelirstory of that language provide two guideposts for determining whether the class of recoras sought by ~mp
troller General fall within his statutory authority.~, we
must be guided by the congressional concern for rotecting
the privac~riv~te contractors from broa -r~~ov
ernmental intrusionrnto their business affairs. ~he
language chosen by Congress to safeguard that privacy interest directs our attention to the terms and conditions of the
particular contract and instructs us to ensure that the requested records have a close connection to that contract.
With these principles in mind, we turn to th~c cont~
tions of the p_ru:ties.
,.._____-- '-.!
III
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals erred

•. •t
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in holding that records of Merck's indirect costs 8 are not "directly pertinent" to the contracts in question. It offers three
principal reasons for concluding that such cost records directly pertain to the four fixed-price contracts at issue. We
address each in turn.
A
First, the Government maintains that Merck's indirect
~ ~e d~ec~~t1Ln.JIDt to-the fixed-price contracts because Mere uses payments made by the Government under
these contracts to defray indirect expenses. Thus, the Government would have us define as "directly pertinent" the
records of any costs defrayed from commingled general revenues that include government payments under the contract.
Under that definition, records of expenditures to purchase
raw materials for the manufacture of an entirely different
product than that sold under the government contract or to
invest in the stock of another corporation would be subject to
inspection by the Comptroller General.
This interpretation contravenes both of the interpretive
principles identified. First, the Government's interpretation would permit far-ranging governmental scrutiny of a
contractor's business records of nongovernmental transactions completely unrels:tted to either the contract underlying
the access demand or~the product procured under that contract. Indeed, carried to its logical extreme, the argument
would dictate that few, if an of a rivate contractor's business records would be immune from GAO scrutmy, thereby
violating tile congressional concern for protecting the privacy
of the contractor's business records. In addition, the Government's argument focuses not on the nature of the particular government contract to determine whether any costs
8
By indirect costs we mean costs incurred in the areas of research and
development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration,
which are not directly attributable to a particular product.

j
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records are relevant to that contract, but on the fact that the
Government's transactions with the contractor contribute to
the financial support for the contractor's entire enterprise.
B
Second, focusing on the Comptroller General's overall statutory respons1 11 1e , e overnmen argues at recor s of
a ~ct costs are "necessary and appropriate
to determine whether the price charged the government
was" extravagant, excessive, or wasteful. Brief for Petitioners in No. 81-1273, p. 33. 9 Under 31 U. S. C. § 53(a),
Congress charged the Comptroller General with the responsibility to "investigate ... all matters relating to the receipt,
disbursement, and application of public funds" and to "make
recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in
public expenditures." See also 31 U. S. C. §§ 60, 65(a). According to the Government, the legislative history of the access statutes reveals that Congress regarded the access authority granted therein as one of the tools by which the
Comptroller General was to fulfill his statutory mission under
31 U. S. C. § 53(a). 10 The Government argues that, in an industry in which indirect costs represent such a large proportion of total costs, 11 access to records of those costs is critical
to an understanding of the industry with which the Govern9
We observe, however, that the Government has conceded in this action that it has no reason to suspect that Merck has engaged in any fraud or
impropriety in connection with the negotiation or performance of these
contracts. App. 41a-44a, 76a. Nor does the Government have any reason to believe that the prices charged under these contracts were unreasonable in any way. Id., at 42a, 76a. In fact, the price under each of the
contracts was the lowest price at which Merck sold each of the products to
anyone at the time the contracts were awarded. Id., at 26a, 42a.
10
Representative Hardy explained that the two major purposes of the
bill were "to give the Comptroller General the tools to do the job the Congress has instructed him to do ... and ... to provide a deterrent to improprieties and wastefulness in the negotiation of contracts." 97 Cong. Rec.
13198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy).
11
The Government suggests that direct costs may represent as little as
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ment is dealing and to an assessment of the fairness of the
contract price and the advisability of continued adherence to
the negotiated procurement methods employed under these
contracts. In short, the Government contends that denying
access to indirect cost records would impede the GAO in its
mission to improve the procurement process generally.
The Government's a eal to oli ar ments favoring
broad access is mdee emptmg. Were our function to act as
policymakers, we might well be swayed, for the taxpayer's
interest in receiving the maximum protection against imprudent or unwise government procurement methods is strong.
Nevertheless, policymaking is not our task. We are constrained to interpret t e c o ces ongress has already made,
as revealed by the language and legislative history of the access-to-records statutes.
Turning to the language, we find that, as an explanation of
why indirect cost records "directly pertain to" and "involve
transactions related to" the four fixed-price contracts here,
the Government's argument must fail. Reduced to its essentials, the argu~ ny cost records that are directly pertinent to the Comptro er enera s general oversight responsibilities for the procurement process are within
the scope of a proper inquiry by the Comptroller General.
So phrased, it becomes clear that this second argument is
also inconsistent with the limiting language of the statute and
the policy behind that language. By adding the "directly"
pertinent limitation, Congress clearly dia notWrsfi to grant
the Comptronef Genera~and all records
tha m
e ep 1 o e
m
mg 1 s general statutory responsibilities. The language reads directly pertinent "to the contract," and not directly pertinent to the
GAO's oversight responsibilities.
Further, the legislative history reveals that Congress did
9% of the sales price of a pharmaceutical product.
No. 81-1273, p. 34.

Brief for Petitioners in
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not view the statutes as a new, independent directive to the
GAO to act as a roving commission to ferret out waste, extravagance, and inefficiency by inspecting whatever records
might reveal these problems. The Government concedes
that Congress' primary concern or purpose in enacting the
access provisions was to equip the GAO to detect fraud and
improprieties. Brief for Respondents in No. 81-1472, p. 11.
To suggest that another principal purpose of the statutes
was to equip the GAO to detect waste, extravagance, and inefficiency wherever they might find them is inconsistent with
the repeated representations that the bill's principal purpose
was limited. Representative Hardy: st~ed: "The sole purpose of the bill is to enaore-trie 'Comptroller General to make
effective audits along the lines and under the jurisdiction
conferred upon the General Accounting Office by law. This
is merely to give him the tools with which to work." 97
Gong. Rec. 12611 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy) (emphasis
added). He~ ~ned: "This bill would at least enable the agent o ongress to check~, both
from ~rds and tne contractors' books."
ld., at 13198 (emphasis added). 12
Of course, Representative Hardy recognized that the
12

As the following monologue by congressman Hardy also reveals, he
viewed the bill as giving the GAO the ability to check the records of a
transaction between the contractor and the Government during the audit
process in order to detect the kind of fraud or impropriety that would permit the GAO to disallow improper or illegal payments. He further expected that knowledge of GAO's ability to oversee the transaction would
deter any improprieties during negotiations.
"[T]he audit which GAO performs is directed primarily to the accounts of
the accountable officers of the Government and not to the contractors
themselves. The GAO is required by law to take exceptions against accountable officers for erroneous or illegal payments.
"... [M]y main purpose in offering this bill was to place on the statute
books a law which will act as a deterrent to improprieties in the negotiation
of Government contracts.
"In conclusion, I repeat that this bill does not add to the present audit
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GAO's review of records directly pertinent to the particular
transaction might disclose "a lot of other situations besides
those involving fraud." Id., at 13199. Indeed, discovery of
other weaknesses in the procurement process-short of those
that might prompt the GAO to disallow payments-would
naturally be expected to occur through review of directly
pertinent data. Nowhere did Representative Hardy suggest, however, that the Comptroller General's access to a
contractor's records was designed to enable the GAO to inspect whatever records the GAO might find helpful to uncovering waste, extravagance, or inefficiency.
In sum, it appears that the sponsor regarded the bill primarily as a tool for protecting the Government from being defrauded in the articular tr sa tion, and thought that the
access authority wou d ave incidental value in allowing the
GAO to detect other weaknesses in the procurement process.13 Therefore, while we do not deny that the statutes may
be useful to the GAO in accomplishing its broader goals, it is
not clear that these broader purposes motivated the legislation and should therefore be a definitive guide to interpretation of the meaning of "directly pertinent." These broader
potential benefits of GAO inspection cannot license us to ignore the express limitations contained in the statute.
We are also convinced that the express congressional purauthority of the General Accounting Office ....
"The major purposes of this bill are twofold: One, to give the Comptroller General the proper tools to do the [audit] job the Congress has instructed him to do; and, two, to provide a deterrent to improprieties and
wastefulness in the negotiation of contracts." I d., at 13197-13198 (emphasis added).
The thrust of all these assurances is that the access provisions would serve
as an adjunct to the GAO's audit powers and would make such audits more
effective.
13
Cf. 97 Cong. Rec. 13377 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy) ("[W]e are not
anticipating that the General Accounting Office could possibly go into all
these things, but they would have the right to do it if they had any reason
to suspect fraud or bad faith or illegality.") (emphasis added).
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pose, conceded by the Government, of equipping the GAO to
detect fraud and improprieties with respect to specific contracts, will be served by our reading of the limiting language.
Representative Hardy set forth a number of specific problems or "typical situations in which the authority of this bill
would play an effective part." Id., at 13198. Our holding
that indirect cost records are not subject to review under a
pure fixed-price contract will not impede use of the access
provisions to ctlret:lmse specific problems. For example,
Representative Hardy expressed concern over the practice of
a contractor, awarded both fixed-price and cost-plus government contracts, of submitting as claims for reimbursement
under the cost-plus contract expenses actually incurred in the
performance of the fixed-price contract. There can be no
doubt that records of costs, both direct and indirect, are directly pertinent to a contract when the price paid by the Government is expressly based on the costs of perlormance.
The GAO therefore would have broad access to a contractor's
records under the cost-plus contract and thereby could detect
this expense-shifting activity.
Another example given by Representative Hardy was the
misrepresentation by a construction contractor of his overhead costs, which are "supposed to be based upon the experience of the contractor in performing similar work in the
past." Ibid. Again, however, where representations regarding costs are made during the negotiation process,
records of those costs become directly pertinent to and involve transactions relating to the contract. Here Merck
made no representations and was not questioned about its
costs during the negotiations. Nor was Merck requested to
provide cost data.
In a third example, Representative Hardy referred to the
representations about costs made in support of a price redetermination request under a price redeterminable contract. He felt that the prospect of GAO review of these cost
records would provide an incentive to government officers to

I
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perform their redetermination functions more carefully.
This example, like the others, reflects problems that arise
from misrepresentations regarding costs during negotiations
or that are otherwise connected with cost-based contracts.
Obviously, our reading of the statute will have no effect on
the usefulness of the access provisions in these areas.
Finally, Representative Hardy referred to the problem of
the Government's relative disadvantage at the negotiating
table. The Government seizes upon this reference to argue,
in essence, that any records that might improve the Government's negotiating position for the future should be accessible
to the Comptroller General. We have already noted, supra,
at - - , that this general theory is inconsistent with the language of the statute, which directs us to ascertain the direct
pertinence of records to the specific contract and not to the
GAO's general oversight responsibilities. Moreover, Representative Hardy apparently did not view the access statutes
as a panacea for any lack of governmental negotiating expertise. He commented: "This bill would at least enable the
agent of Congress to check the transaction, both from the
Government records and the contractors' books." 97 Gong.
Rec. 13198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy) (emphasis
added). 14
14
In connection with this concern for sharpening the Government's negotiating skills, it is significant to note that the type of negotiated contracts
involved in this action has been exempted from required review of cost
data under related procurement statutes. The Renegotiation Act, 50
U. S. C. App. §§ 1211 et seq., which established a Renegotiation Board
commissioned to eliminate excessive profits on defense contracts, expressly exempts from the required submission of cost and profit information to the Board government contracts involving "standard commercial articles." 50 U. S. C. § 1216(e)(1)(A). This exemption reflects Congress'
presumption "that the prices which prevail on the open market place are
fair prices, and do not involve excessive profits." 99 Cong. Rec. 10272
(1953) (remarks of Sen. Milliken).
Similarly, the Truth in Negotiations Act exempts from its requirement
that contractors submit cost and pricing data during negotiations contracts
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c
Nor are we persuaded by the Government's argument that
the GAO's consistent and longstanding interpretation of its
authority under the access-to-records statutes supports the
view that all cost records are subject to examination under a
fixed-price contract of the type in question here. Even if the
GAO's interpretation could be so characterized, that interpretation would not be entitled to deference, for, as we have
noted above, the broad interpretation urged here is inconsisnegotiated on the basis of the established catalog price for a standard commercial item or on the basis of other indicia of adequate price competition.
10 U. S. C. § 2306(f). The 1968 amendments to the Truth in Negotiations
Act, Pub. L. 90-512, 82 Stat. 863, which extended to the government purchasing agency a right of access to the contractor's books and records for
purposes of conducting post-performance audits, also exempted non-costbased contracts. Hearings on the 1968 legislation established that the
amendments were designed to grant the purchasing agency "the same type
of access to records that the Congress has now made available to the General Accounting Office." Hearings on the Review of Defense Procurement
Policies, Procedures, and Practices Before the Subcommittee for Special
Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 61 (1967) (testimony of John Malloy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense).
To the extent Congress was concerned during its consideration of the access provisions in 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c) with improving the Government's strength at the negotiating table, that concern is
more directly addressed by the Truth in Negotiations Act. Requiring
submission of the contractors' most accurate, complete, and current cost
and pricing information during the negotiations would seem the most direct way to safeguard the Government against the "sharp practices" of negotiators for the private contractor. Notwithstanding its recognition that
r negotiated contracts require close supervision and control because of the
~sence of competitive market forces in setting the price, Congress express! exem ted the kind of contracts involved in this action. Although,
un er norma princip es of statutory cons ruction, this related legislation
does not control our interpretation of the access provisions, Congress' apparent judgment that these contracts pose no particular danger to the Government certainly makes it more difficult to contend that Congress in 1951
would have viewed cost records as "directly pertinent" to a fixed-price
contract.

·.
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tent with the statutory language. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 411 (1979).
Moreover, it is clear that the GAO's current sweeping interpretation of its access power directly conflicts with its contemporaneous interpretation of the legislation when Congress was considering the bill in 1951. 15 In letters to the
chairmen of the relevant House and Senate committees, the
Acting Comptroller General identified only one purpose of
the bill: "[T]he proposed legislation is intended as a deterrent
to those persons who might otherwise abuse the authority to
~otiate., certain contracts without advertising."
H. R.
Rep. No. 791, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1951); S. Rep. No. 603,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1951). Moreover, in his 1951 annual
report to Congress, the Comptroller General expressed his
view that the access-to-records statutes were designed "to
strengthen General Accounting Office auditing and to make it
more effective" by serving as a deterrent "in preventing
fraud in Government contracts." Annual Report of the
Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal Year
Er;ded June 30, 1951, at 67 (1951).
/In contrast to this more limited, contemporaneous interpretation of its authority by the GAO, the Government cites
nothing contemporaneous that directly supports its view that
all cost records under a fixed-price contract are subject to
GAO inspection. The only directly supportive statements
by the GAO occur in testimony before a congressional subcommittee in 1963 regarding its litigation of the scope of its
access authority in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States,
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988
(1968). 16 In light of the GAO's litigation posture during these
An agency's contemporaneous construction of a statute under which it
operates " 'carries more weight' " when the agency's views are "'directly
made known ... to Congress in committee hearings.'" SEC v. Sloan, 436
U. S. 103, 120 (1978), quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 192 (1969).
16
Hewlett-Packard, like this case, involved a request by the Comptroller
General to review cost records of a contractor who entered into fixed-price
negotiated contracts. During that litigation, a congressional subcommit16
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hearings, this testimony cannot provide persuasive evidence
of the GAO's consistent interpretation or practice. 17
Indeed, other evidence of GAO's post-enactment interpretation and use of its access authority undercuts the Government's contention. In his 1955 annual report to Congress,
the Comptroller General explained that the GAO's use of its
access authority has focused primarily on audits of cost-based
tee commenced hearings to investigate "the need for, or desirability of,
recommending legislative action" in light of Hewlett-Packard's refusal to
permit inspection of its cost records under the access provisions. Hearings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). During the course of these hearings, Robert Keller, General Counsel of the GAO, testified concerning the
GAO's position with respect to the Hewlett-Packard situation.
"It is our position that the contract clause and the statute give us the
right to examine the cost records of the contractor and other pertinent data
that relates [sic] to items included in the contract, in sufficient completeness and detail to permit us to determine the reasonableness of the negotiated prices." Id., at 10.
Mr. Keller further stated that the GAO could "go beyond direct manufacturing costs" into such areas as "how research costs are allocated as between the Government contract and commercial business." Id., at 23.
In legislative hearings in 1965, which in part addressed "the extent of the
GAO's right to examine contractor books and records," Hearings on Comptroller General Reports to Congress on Audits of Defense Contracts Before
the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), the Comptroller General again referred to his position in the Hewlett-Packard case, which was
still pending in the courts, regarding the proper interpretation of the access provisions. Id., at 45.
17
Later, in the hearings that provided the impetus for the eventual issuance of an access demand letter to Merck, the Assistant General Counsel of _I\ . .A •
the GAO testified that the access provisions would permit the GAO "to ex- ~cva ~ ~
amine records of costs, direct and indirect, generated in the performance of look. tO.GIIl ~
[a negotiated] contract." Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee
on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8018 (1971). Although the Government relies upon this 1971 testimony for the proposition that direct and
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contracts:
"The examination of contract activities is concerned
primarily with the operation and administration of those
types of negotiated contracts under which the Government has a financial interest in the costs of performance.
They usually are cost-reimbursement-type contracts and
the various forms of price redetermination or incentive
contracts under which the ultimate price is materially affected by costs of performance." Annual Report of the
Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal
Year Ending June 30, 1955, at 22 (1955). 18
Further, for the years 1974 and 1975, the only years for
which there is record evidence, every neg_otiated_contract audited by the GAO under its access authority was a cost-based
ccmtract negotiated on the basis of~ost estimatetsupport~
by cost or pricing data. App. 22a-23a, Lfl>a. And, in a ruling of particular significance for the facts of this case, the
Comptroller General determined in 1967 that the access provisions do not confer upon the GAO the right to examine
records relating to a contractor's nongovernmental business,
even when such review is necessary to determine whether a
catalog-priced item was actually sold in substantial quantities
to the general public. App. 162a-163a.
Finally, memoranda of the GAO reveal its view of the limited scope of its access authority. In late 1969, the GAO preindirect cost records are accessible, as here, in the case of a pure fixedprice contract, that testimony does not specify whether reference is made
to fixed-price, as well as cost-based, negotiated contracts.
18
Even the 1956 annual report, upon which the Government relies, emphasizes the GAO's focus on cost-based negotiated contracts. "[Negotiated] contracts are negotiated largely on the basis of actual or estimated
cost and it is, therefore, essential that the contract prices be carefully analyzed and evaluated." Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the
United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1956, at 23 (1956) (emphasis added).
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pared a memorandum for Congress in connection with congressional consideration of a proposed grant of additional
access authority to the GAO to pursue a study of contractor
profits in the defense industry. In the memorandum, the
GAO informed Congress that its authority under the 1951 access provisions did not extend to review of records of a contractor's nongovernmental business and that additional access authority was therefore necessary to conduct a profit
study. 115 Cong. Rec. 25800-25801 (1969) (reprinting GAO
Memorandum on the Adequacy of the Legal Authority of the
Comptroller General to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of
Profitability in Defense Contracting). 19 A 1970 internal
19
It is significant to note that the profit study of the defense industry,
which Congress authorized as part of the Military Appropriations Act of
1970, Pub. L. 91- 121, § 408, 83 Stat. 204, is the only occasion on which Congress has deliberately granted the GAO the kind of broad-ranging authority it asserts here. In conferring this authority, Congress, wary of equipping the GAO to conduct a "fishing expedition," 115 Cong. Rec. 25795
(1969) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff), carefully limited such authority to "only a
single study." /d., at 25793 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
Although not conclusive with respect to interpretation of the 1951 access
statutes, subsequent congressional rebuffs of GAO requests for expansion
of its access authority are instructive both with regard to the GAO's view
of the limits of the 1951 legislation and Congress' apparent reluctance to
broaden that legislation. For example, a Senate bill introduced in 1973
directed that "the Comptroller General ... shall . .. have access for the
purpose of audit and examination to any books, documents, papers and
records ... which in the opinion of . .. the Comptroller General may be
related or pertinent to the ... contracts . .. [or] subcontracts." S. 2049,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (emphasis added). Another Senate bill which,
like S. 2049 never emerged from committee, would have granted the
Comptroller General authority to undertake a study of profits made on
Government and commercial contracts by contractors having Government
contracts aggregating $1 million or more. To enable the Comptroller General to make such studies, the bill gave him the authority to demand from
the contractor "such information maintained in the normal course of business . . . as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropri-
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memorandum also reveals the GAO's belief that amendment
of the 1951 access statutes would be necessary to give it the
power to examine records of indirect costs and the power to
inspect records considered "necessary to evaluate the efficiency and economy of the contractors' operations," rather
than only records pertinent to particular contracts. App.
160a-161a.

In sum, GAO's contemporaneous interpretation of the
scope of its access power and the history of administrative
practice under the statutes favor Merck's position in this
action. 20
To summarize, we have determined both that the Government's intepretation of "directly pertinent" admits of no doctrinal limitation, rendering nugatory the lim~f
t~nd that the GAO's current interpretation of the
statute is not entitled to deference. Applying the interpretive principles identified above, Part II, supra, we hold that
when the terms of a pure fixed-price negotiated contract are
not expressly tied to a contractor's indirect costs and the conate." S. 3014, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See also S. 2268, 94th Cong. ,
1st Sess. (1975).
20
The Government also argues that "directly pertinent" should not be
defined to exclude Merck's indirect cost records simply because Merck has
chosen not to allocate indirect costs to the individual products supplied
under the contract. To the extent the Government attributes this position
to Merck, it mischaracterizes Merck's argument. The pertinence of
Merck's indirect costs to the contracts simply does not depend upon the internal accounting practices Merck has adopted. Rather, the nature of the
contract and the circumstances under which it was negotiated determine
whether access to these records is permissible under the statutes. Therefore, as Merck contends, even if it had fully allocated all of its costs,
records of those costs still would not directly pertain to a fixed-price contract under which costs play no role in the negotiation, pricing, or performance. Conversely, cost records would be directly pertinent to a cost-based
contract without regard to whether the costs were allocated or unallocated.
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tractor makes no re resentations durin ne otiations re arding t ose costs, records of those costs do not "directly pertain
to" or "involve transactions relating to the contract" and are
therefore not subject to inspection by the Comptroller General under 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c).
~he Government objects that such a holding creates an exemption for fixed-price negotiated contracts that has no basis
in the statutory language. We disagree. First, to conclude
that fixed-price contracts are automatically exempt would be
an unwarranted extension of our holding. There are varieties of fixed-price contracts under which the price ultimately
paid by the Government is, in accordance with the particular
contract terms, influenced in some direct manner by costs. 21
Moreover, even under a pure fixed-price, non-cost-based
contract, the contractors' costs may nevertheless play a substantial role in the negotiations. For example, although the
government contracting officer may ultimately accept the
firm fixed-price proposed by the contractor, he may be persuaded to do so only after concluding, on the basis of the contractor's representations regarding its costs or the relationship of those costs to the proposed price, that the price term
is fair and reasonable. Where such representations regarding costs are part of an actual negotiation of the price, our
holding would not preclude a finding that cost records are
subject to examination even under a pure fixed-price negotiated contract. 22
21

See generally 1 R. Nash and J. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law
414-415 (3d ed. 1977) (discussing fixed price contract with escalation
clause, fixed price incentive contract, and fixed price redeterminable
contract).
22
With respect to fixed-price contracts in which the price, as here, is
based on the catalog price or the price is otherwise based on adequate price
competition, we note that the exemption from the required submission of
cost and pricing data during negotiations is a permissive rather than a
mandatory exemption. 10 U. S. C. § 2306(f) (requirements "need not be
applied" to such defense procurement contracts); 41 CFR § 1-3.807-3(b)
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IV
We briefly address Merck's contention that even records of
direct costs 23 are not within the class of records to wfiiCii tfie
statutes permit access when the procurement contracts are of
the nature involved here. Our agreement with Merck's position must follow from the princ1p es we
e se ort a ove.
e erms and conditions o tlie four contracts
We repeat a
in question are not expressly based on, nor were they arrived
at during the course of negotiations on the basis of representations about, Merck's costs-either direct or indirect.
Under these circumstances, direct cost records do not directly pertain to or involve transactions relating to the contracts in question.
In Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388, 1391, affd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2
1980) (per curiam), affd by an equally divided Court, 451
U. S. 400 (1981), the district court accepted, without analysis
or discussion, the contractor's agreement to provide records
relating to manufacturing costs as a "sensible point at which
to draw the line." 24 Although the distinction between direct
cost and indirect cost records, which was also adopted by the
courts below, presents an attractive compromise, it is nothing more than that: a compromise which is not the product of
reasoned analysis. 25 If, as under the circumstances here, the

It \ ~·~

~

(1981) (same with respect to such civilian procurement contracts).
-\Q.;..
\lldf\c,Qp
therefore lies completely within the power of government contracting wJ- ~ of_. ~
agencies to ensure that cost records become directly pertinent to such con- ~'\\it'?
~
tracts simp! by demanding that contractors submit cost and pricing data
0
d~ ~egotiations .
23
Tli~nclude

direct manufacturing and overhead costs incurred
in producing the specific drug items procured under the four contracts.
24
Of course, our affirmance by an equally divided Court in Bristol is not
entitled to precedential weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 192
(1972).
21> We observe that the decision in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States,
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968), permitting

/1 _,

y

')'t..(YLl;
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terms and conditions of the contract are not expressly tied to
the contractor's costs, and the contractor makes no representations during negotiations regarding those costs, records of
those costs do not become any more directly pertinent to such
a contract simply because they relate to direct costs rather
than indirect costs.
One might argue that direct costs "directly pertain" even
to a contract in which the price is not expressly tied to costs
because no rational businessman would establish even a catalog price without some assessment of the costs of performance and the margin of profit necessary to avoid a loss on the
product. This argument, while appealing as an assumption
about business realities, misses the relevant inquiry to which
the language of the statute directs our attention. The statute does not grant access to all records that, from the contractor's perspective, were directly pertinent to his decision
in the negotiating process. Instead, the Comptroller General may examine only those records that the terms and conditions of the contract, together with any representations
made during the negotiations, reveal as directly pertinent to
the transaction.

v

In our judgment, the only records directly pertinent to the
four fixed-price, non-cost-based contracts in question here
are those necessary to verify that Merck actually had an esaccess to direct cost records under a fixed-price contract, rested on what
can only be described as a tortured construction of the term "contract."
According to the court, the statutory term referred to the general subject
matter of the contract-i. e., procurement of described property by the
Government. ld., at 1016. However, the court's initial assessment of the
statute and its application to the kind of contract in question here was more
accurate; if the term "contract" refers to the terms and conditions of the
specific agreement, then "data pertaining to costs could not be said to directly pertain to, and involve transactions relating to, a contract in which
production costs were not taken into consideration in arriving at its terms
and conditions." Ibid.

z
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tablished catalog price for the item procured, that it sold the
item in substantial quantities to the general public at the catalog price, that it delivered the product specified, and that it
received from the Government no more than the amount due
under the contract. 26
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed insofar as it denied access to Merck's indirect cost
records and is reversed insofar as it permitted access to
direct cost records.
It is so ordered.

In light of our disposition of the direct and indirect cost issues, we need
not address Merck's additional argument that, because the records were
sought for an improper purpose-i. e., for an industry-wide profit study,
none of its records is accessible to the Comptroller General.
26
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Memorandum of JUSTICE WHITE.
The preliminary vote at conference in these cases was to
adopt Merck's position and hold that the GAO is not entitled
to access to any of Merck's cost records. Merck's theory has
been emphatically rejected by every Court of Appeals that
has considered it, 1 and, in my view, we should do likewise,
' In addition to the opinion below in the present case, 665 F. 2d 1236
(CADC 1981), see SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981),
cert. pending, No. 81-2082; United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F.
2d 672 (CA7 1979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904 (CA7), cert.
denied , 439 U. S. 959 (1978); and Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States,
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). Apparently
recognizing the untenability of the argument advanced here by Merck, the
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because the result Merck seeks can be achieved only by distorting the statutory language and the legislative history.
The statutory provisions at issue, 10 U. S.C. §2313(b) and
41 U. S. C. § 254(c), clearly were intended to allow the GAO
a reasonable degree of access to contractors' records needed
to determine whether prices charged to the government were
excessive. Hence, I could not agree with the Conference
vote. This memorandum expresses my present view ..
I

In each of the four contracts involved here, the United
States agreed to purchase certain pharmaceutical products
from Merck at a fixed price. In each instance, Merck proposed a contract price based on its catalog or "market" price,
and the government contracting officer accepted the proposal
without any "haggling" or other negotiation as to price.
Each of the contracts contains the statutorily-mandated provision allowing the GAO the right to inspect Merck's books
and records that are "directly pertinent" to the contract.
The GAO now seeks to examine those Merck records that
indicate the cost to Merck of the goods sold to the government. The GAO deems such an examination necessary to
carry out its statutory duty to "investigate ... all matters
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds," and to "make recommendations looking to greater
economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C.
§53( a).
By inspecting Merck's cost records, the GAO hopes to be
able to estimate whether the contract price paid by the govpharmaceutical manufacturer in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F.
Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F . 2d 17 (CA21980), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), did not even dispute that it was
"obliged by the terms of the contracts to provide access to records of its
manufacturing costs, records which relate to the pricing of the products delivered and records required to verify all data obtained during the course of
the review." 428 F. Supp. , at 1389.
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ernment was a fair one. The GAO has confirmed by experience the common-sense observation that the mere "fact that
a product is listed in a manufacturer's catalog and offered to
any customer is no assurance that . . . the standard catalog
price is reasonable." 2 If the GAO's inspection were to reveal that Merck's prices were unreasonably high, the GAO
presumably would recommend to the contracting agencies
that they "negotiate prices more carefully or . . . obtain
greater competition in future similar procurements,'' 3 or that
they take other action "looking to greater economy or efficiency," 31 U. 8. C. § 53(a), in future expenditures.
Merck asserts, however, that, despite the inclusion of the
access-to-records provision in the contracts, the GAO has no
right to inspect its books to determine how much it cost
Merck to produce the products sold to the government. This
assertion is based on two related but independent premises:
first, that a contractor's cost records cannot be "directly pertinent" to a fixed-price contract based on catalog prices, and,
second, that the GAO can exercise its right of access only if it
suspects that the contractor has engaged in fraud or other
improper conduct. Neither of these propositions has the
slightest degree of merit.
II
As we frequently iterate, we begin with the language of
the statute. E. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union, - - U. 8. - - (1982); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U. 8. 560, 568 (1979). The legislation
at issue requires unadvertised government contracts to include a clause allowing the GAO to examine any of the con2
Hearings on the Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before
the Subcomm. for Special Investigations of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1963) (remarks of Robert Keller, General Counsel of the GAO).
3
Joint App., at 23a (affidavit of Paul Dembling, General Counsel of the
GAO).
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tractor's books, documents, papers, or records "that directly
pertain to, and involve transactions relating to, the contract.
" 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b). See 41 U. S. C. § 254(c).
Nothing in the statutory language excludes records pertaining to fixed-price contracts (in general) or contracts based on
catalog prices (in particular). Nor does anything in the statutes suggest in any way that the GAO must suspect fraud or
wrongdoing before it can exercise its right to examine the
relevant books and records. Therefore, the GAO's claim of a
right of access to Merck's cost records is valid unless the documents the GAO seeks to inspect are not "directly pertinent"
to, or do not "involve transactions relating to," Merck's contracts with the government.
"'[l]t is hard to imagine anything more directly related to a
contract than the cost of producing the items covered by it or
the matters going into the makeup of the price.'" Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 913 (CA7), cert. denied, 439
U. S. 959 (1978). Accord, SmithKlirie Corp. v. Staats, 668
F. 2d 201, 208-209 (CA3 1981); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
United States, 385 F. 2d 1013, 1016 (CA9 1967), cert. denied,
390 U. S. 988 (1968). Merck's argument to the contrary is
based on the proposition that its production costs do not "directly pertain" to the contract "because they were irrelevant
to the negotiation of the contract or to a determination that
the contract was performed in accordance with its terms.''
Merck Br., at 40. The plain language of the access provision, however, entitles the GAO to records directly pertinent
to the contract, which means all aspects of the contract; the
statutory language does not in any way limit the GAO's access to records directly pertinent to only the contract's negotiation or performance.
Merck cites no authority that supports its position. Its
theory is based on the erroneous premise that if the contractor made no representations, and the government's negotiator made no inquiries, as to the contractor's production
costs, such costs must be considered to have been and to be
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irrelevant to the government's decision to enter into the contract. Obviously, however, in instances where the contractual price of an item was unduly higher than the amount it
cost to produce the item, the government most likely would
not have agreed to the contract had it known of this fact.
Therefore, even looking at the statutory language alone,
Merck's contention that its production costs are not directly
pertinent to these contracts is untenable.

III
Even if, contrary to my belief, the statutory language is
somehow regarded as ambiguous, resort to the legislative
history further refutes Merck's position. The legislative history of the access-to-records provisions is relatively brief and
to the point. It demonstrates without the slightest doubt
that Congress intended to allow the GAO authority to examine a contractor's books to evaluate government procurement
techniques by ascertaining whether the government had paid
a reasonable price for the contractor's goods or services, even
in instances where the GAO does not have reason to suspect
that the contractor acted in an improper manner.
Rep. Hardy, the bill's sponsor, began the debate by stating
that his "main purpose" in proposing the legislation was to
provide a "deterrent to improprieties in the negotiation of
Government contracts." 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951).
Merck takes these and other words out of context and comes
to the patently erroneous conclusion that the only intended
purpose of the bill was to deter improprieties such as fraud
and abuse. To the contrary, Rep. Hardy clearly indicated
that the bill was also intended to improve the adequacy of
government procurement techniques in various other ways.
He expressly stated:
"The major purposes of this bill are twofold: One, to give
the Comptroller General the proper tools to do the job
the Congress has instructed him to do; and, two, to pro-
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vide a deterrent to improprieties and wastefulness in the
negotiation of contracts." I d., at 13198.
Merck ignores the first of these two "major purposes." As
noted above, Congress has instructed the GAO to "investigate all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and
application of public funds," and to "make recommendations
looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C. §53( a). 4 There is thus no warrant for
Merck's conclusion that the access-to-records provisions were
not intended to further the GAO's ability to perform these
functions.
Rep. Hardy early explained to his colleagues that normal
procurement procedures called for competitive bidding but
that procurement by negotiation was sometimes necessary.
In the latter context, where there is no competitive bidding
to "operate[] as a brake on the price which a contractor can
demand from the Government," Rep. Hardy saw the need to
establish "every reasonable safeguard against waste and extravagance in the spending" of government funds. 97 Cong.
Rec. 13198 (1951). He felt that, no matter how "conscientious and honest" the government representatives might be,
the contractor's representatives would, in the great majority
of cases, have a tremendous advantage from the standpoint
of both training and experience. Ibid. Thus, there was
"every chance in the world that the Government [would]
come out on the short end of the deal," and Rep. Hardy
deemed it necessary to "at least enable the [GAO] to check
the transaction, both from the Government records and the
contractors' books." Ibid.
Rep. Hardy then gave some factual examples of "typical
' In addition, [t]he Comptroller General is authorized and directed to
make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the
Government ... which ... will enable Congress to determine whether
public funds have been economically and efficiently administered and expended." 31 U. S. C. § 60.
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situations in which the authority of this bill would play an
effective part." Ibid. One such example was about a contractor who charged the government a great deal higher rate
of overhead than it did its private customers. Another example involved a
"situation where the Government was buying parts from
an automobile dealer who, in turn, was getting them
from a parts distributor who, in turn, was getting them
from a small tool shop. Naturally, the price paid by the
Government included profits upon profits and completely
wasteful administrative and handling costs." Ibid.
The sponsor observed that that it "would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the GAO to detect such a situation without
the right afforded" in the bill. Ibid.
It is apparent from Rep. Hardy's remarks that the bill was
intended to guard against more than fraud and abuse. Contractors employing experienced, well-trained negotiators
could not be accused of wrongdoing simply for
"outnegotiating" their government counterparts. The automobile dealer who sold the parts to the government at retail
was not acting fraudulently. Even the contractor who
charged the government more than its private customers
could not, without more, be accused of illegal or unethical
conduct. Yet Rep. Hardy plainly intended that his bill apply
in such situations.
After Rep. Hardy finished his opening statement, he answered a number of questions from other Members of the
House. The following exchange ensued:
"Mr. Mills: ... What the gentleman from Virginia
and the committee, as I understand, are endeavoring to
do, you are endeavoring to pursue a situation that may
be fraudulent, for example, so that the General Accounting Office might look into that question. . . .
Mr. Hardy: The gentleman is right, with this exception that I think should be clearly understood, that there
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are a lot of other situations besides those involving fraud
which might be uncovered.
Mr. Mills: The gentleman from Virginia did not hear
me perhaps. I said an example would be fraud.
Mr. Hardy: That is correct." Id., at 13199 (emphasis
added).

In light of this colloquy, Merck's claim that the statute was
intended to have only a "limited anti-fraud purpose" borders
on the frivolous.
The debate continued two days later when Rep. Hardy
proposed an amendment that would have allowed agency
heads the discretion to omit the access-to-records clause from
contracts with foreign contractors, id., at 13371, and Rep.
Harvey proposed an amendment that would have exempted
"a manufacturer or processor who is a supplier of material to
a primary contractor and who is not a subcontractor" from
the scope of the bill's coverage. I d., at 13376. Both of
these proposals were ultimately defeated, but, during the
lively debate on the proposed amendments, several Members
of Congress stated without contradiction that the bill would
allow the GAO extremely broad authority to examine
records. For example, Rep. Harvey asked whether, if the
bill became law, a subcontractor of a primary government
contractor "would be subject to having all his books opened
up for inspection by Government officials." Id., at 13372
(emphasis added). Rep. Hardy replied that it would, unless
the subcontractor only supplied some "casual item" in connection with the performance of the contract. Ibid. Based on
this understanding, Rep. Harvey later argued that his limiting amendment was needed, because otherwise "every manufacturer ... of ... goods that eventually find their way into
defense production ... is going to have to supply all the answers to the GAO on everything he manufactures." Id., at
13376. "[E]very section of his books will have to come under
the complete scrutiny of the GAO." Ibid. In response,
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Rep. Hardy did not dispute this characterization of the scope
of the GAO's authority, but he nevertheless opposed the Harvey amendment, because it "would make it impossible frequently to obtain information which would be vital in the
study of a contract." Ibid.
Rep. Hoffman, a strong opponent of the bill, several times
during the debate observed that the "GAO under this bill can
go into the books of [contractors] and ask and get from them
anything and everything they want." I d., at 13373. He indicated his belief that the bill would allow the GAO "to snoop
into [a contractor's] books and find out what [the goods or
services] cost[] or what will be a fair price or what profit we
make." Ibid. See also id., at 13375, 13377. Standing
alone, of course, the statements of an opponent of the bill,
such as Rep. Hoffman, would not carry much weight, 5 but
here, even though all comments pro and con were made in the
midst of a free-wheeling debate, the proponent of the bill,
Rep. Hardy, in no way took issue with Rep. Hoffman's view
of the scope of GAO's authority. Rep. Hardy's essential response was that it was necessary to require contractors to afford the GAO this broad authority, and that Rep. Hoffman's
fears of excessive GAO "snooping" were groundless, because
the GAO would have neither the inclination nor the manpower to examine the records of every individual supplier.
Id., at 13376, 13377.
The original Hardy bill required the inclusion, in negotiated contracts, of a clause allowing the GAO the right to examine any records that were "pertinent" to the contract. At
the very end of the debate, Rep. Hoffman proposed the
amendment that added the word "directly" before the word
"pertinent." I d., at 13377. Rep. Hoffman explained that he
had discussed his amendment with Rep. Hardy, the bill's
•see, e. g., National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U. S. 612, 639-640 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 u. s. 384, 394 (1951).
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sponsor, and that, although the amendment was "not all that
it should be," it was the most that Rep. Hardy would agree
to. Ibid. Rep. Hoffman then stated that the purpose of his
amendment was "to limit the snooping that may be carried on
under this bill which we do not have the votes to defeat."
Ibid. At that point, Rep. Hardy remarked that he had no
objection to the amendment, and it was accepted without further discussion. Ibid. 6
In light of Rep. Hardy's consistent position throughout the
debate, it cannot plausibly be argued that he agreed to the
Hoffman amendment with the understanding that it effected
a drastic reduction in the scope of the bill's coverage or purpose. As outlined above, Rep. Hardy continuously spoke of
the need to provide a mechanism to combat waste and extravagance in federal procurement, and he vigorously and
successfully opposed the Harvey amendment, which would
have significantly limited the bill's scope. His acceptance of
the addition of the word "directly" appears to have been
largely a sop to the bill's opponents. The most that can be
said is that Rep. Hardy accepted the amendment to allay concerns that the legislation "would let the GAO go into everybody's business and look it over if they just wanted to take a
look at it .... " Id., at 13373 (Rep. Hoffman). The amendment gave assurance that the bill would not be used as a basis
for inspection of books and records having no substantial connection with government procurement. But the amendment
definitely was not intended to bar the GAO's access to
records legitimately needed to assess the reasonableness of
prices charged to the government, and thereby to protect the
government against waste, excessive prices, and ineffective
procurement. 7
Immediately after passage of the Hoffman amendment, the House
passed the bill, as amended, 97 Cong. Rec. 13378 (1951. On the following
day, the Senate passed it without any debate whatsoever. !d., at 13411.
7
Accord, Merck & Co . v. Staats , 665 F. 2d 1236, 1249 (CADC 1981)
(Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
6
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IV
Although all courts have unequivocally rejected Merck's
argument that the GAO may not inspect any cost records in
situations such as the one here, the court below in the
present case, and some other lower courts in similar cases, 8
have refused to uphold the GAO's claim of a right of access to
all the cost records it wishes to examine, including some
records that are undeniably essential to an accurate determination of whether the government wasted money by entering into these contracts. Applying the so-called "Bristol
test,'' 9 these courts have limited the GAO's access to records
pertaining to a contractor's
"manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging materials, labor and fringe benefits, quality control and supervision); manufacturing overhead (including plant administration, production planning, warehousing, utilities
Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 916 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978); Comment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1157-1158 (1979) ("[t]he court [in Eli Lilly]
correctly rejected Lilly's argument that the insertion of the word 'directly'
into the 'directly pertinent' formula sharply narrowed the scope of inquiry
to be allowed the GAO").
In SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201, 210 (CA3 1981), cert.
pending, No. 81-2082, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the government's contention that the Hoffman amendment "meant nothing." The
court therefore adopted the standard formulated in Bristol Laboratories v.
Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), but it did so only
because the government did not suggest any alternative definition of "directly pertinent" records that it wished the court to adopt if it did not agree
with the government's reading of the statute. For an explanation of the
Bristol standard, and my reasons for believing that the Bristol test is not
entirely correct, see part IV, infra.
8
See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, No. 81-2082; Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY
1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451
u. s. 400 (1981).
9
The test was first adopted by the District Court in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, supra.
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and security); royalty expenses; and delivery costs." 10
The Bristol test excludes:
"data with respect to research and development, marketing and promotion, distribution and administration
(except to the extent that these areas may be included in
the factors listed above). 11 •
This test has been described, perhaps inaccurately, 12 as being
based on a "direct costs v. indirect costs" or an "allocated
costs v. unallocated costs" dichotomy.
The courts that have adopted this test have no doubt been
influenced by a perceived need to come up with some form of
reasonable limitation on the broad access demand the GAO
has made. The GAO claims it has the right to examine
records pertaining to every cost "defrayed from commingled
general revenues that include the government's payments
under the contract." Although it is arguable that the GAO's
demand is somewhat overbroad, I am not convinced that the
proper conclusion is to limit the GAO to the cost records allowable under the Bristol test.
The Bristol court adopted its standard solely on the basis
of the cost records that the contractor was willing to disclose
to the GAO. The court felt that the contractor's offer "reflected a responsible and reasonable effort to distinguish 'directly pertinent' matter within the meaning of the access to
records clause." 13 The court thus accepted the contractor's
contention that the cost records it was not willing to disclose
had "only the most general relation, if any, to the prices
charged." 14
428 F. Supp., at 1389.
I d., at 1389--1390.
12
The Bristol court itself stated that the costs records held examinable
under its test are "by no means ... limit[ ed]" to direct costs. I d., at 1391.
13
Ibid.
1
' I d., at 1390.
10
11
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Although cost records having, at most, only an insubstantial relation to the price charged are not "directly pertinent"
to the contract, it is apparent that many of the records
deemed unexaminable under Bristol relate to costs that may
have had a critical bearing on the prices charged, and that
would be of central importance to a GAO inquiry into the fairness of these prices. In the pharmaceutical industry, it has
been estimated that "direct" or "allocated" costs comprise
only about nine per cent of the sale price of individual products. The so-called "indirect" or "unallocated" costs-primarily research and development, advertising and other promotion, general administrative expenses, taxes, and profitare much larger and economically more significant. 15 Yet,
under the Bristol test, the GAO is denied access to all
records in this category, thus making it impossible for the
GAO to make an accurate assessment of the fairness of the
prices and thus the adequacy of the government's procurement technique. 16
In my view, the correct rule in a case of this nature is that
any books or records that bear directly on the question
whether the government paid a fair price for the goods or
services it purchased are "directly pertinent" to the contract
of purchase. In the present case, the GAO needs to make an
16
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, supra, at 913; Merck & Co. v. Staats, supra,
at 1247 (Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reekie, Price
and Quality Competition in the United States Drug Industry, 26 J. Indus.
Econ. 223, 235 (1978); Rucker, Public Policy Considerations in the Pricing
of Prescription Drugs in the United States, 4 Int'l J. Health Services 171,
173 (1974).
16
For example, the Bristol test does not allow the GAO to examine a
contractor's records of advertising costs. One would imagine that, if the
GAO were aware that a great percentage of the cost of the products of a
certain company went to support a large advertising campaign, rather
than, say, to maintain quality control, the GAO might recommend to the
contracting agency that it not deal with that company in the future. Yet,
under the Bristol test, the GAO would not be able to obtain the information
needed to make such a recommendation .

..
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examination of at least some of Merck's "indirect" cost
records in order to make an adequate evaluation of the fairness of the contracts. The records of these costs therefore
directly pertain to the contracts.

v
It does not necessarily follow from what has just been said
that the GAO is entitled to all the information it claims it
needs to determine the fairness of the prices Merck charged
to the government. Although the GAO has a contractual
and statutory right to examine Merck's books to the extent
necessary to ascertain whether Merck's prices were excessive, this right is not without limits. Where, as here, the
GAO wishes to see a contractor's records and the contractor
declines to accede voluntarily to a GAO request, the GAO
must issue an administrative subpoena. If the contractor
refuses to comply with the subpoena, the GAO must apply to
a District Court for enforcement of the subpoena. 31
U. S. C. §54( c) (Supp. V 1981). 17
Once in the District Court, a contractor such as Merck has
the benefit of all of this Court's jurisprudence limiting the
bounds of an agency's right to demand the production of a private entity's records. Essentially, in assessing an agency's
application for enforcement of an administrative subpoena,
we have insisted that the agency's demand be reasonable.
The general rule is that "when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment
The GAO has had this subpoena power only since 1980. See Pub. L.
96-226 § 102(c), 94 Stat. 312 (Apr. 3, 1980) (codified as 31 U. S. C. § 54(c)).
Prior to 1980, the GAO could only sue for specific performance of its contractual right of access. See, e. g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States,
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). The GAO
can still opt in favor of this latter, slower course, but the government does
not make any claim that its rights in a specific performance action would be
any different from those in an action for judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena. See Oral Arg. Trans., at 29-30.
17

l
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requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope,
relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unduly burdensome." See v. City of Seattle,
387 U. S. 541, 544 (1967). See United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652-653 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 208 (1946); 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 4:15 (2d ed. 1978). This standard is a flexible one that takes into account the extent to
which the public interest will be served if the subpoena is enforced. See v. City of Seattle, supra, at 545.
Accordingly, I would remand these cases to the District
Court, with instructions to uphold the GAO's request for access to Merck's "direct" and "indirect" cost records, but only
to the extent that the request is reasonable in scope and
would not unduly burden Merck. Merck has presented evidence that compliance with the GAO's demand would entail
substantial expense and disruption of its operations. If the
GAO's request is upheld in its entirety, an entire team of
GAO auditors may remain on site at Merck for over two
years. 18 This, of course, is a matter for first-instance determination by the District Court, but, if the proposed GAO inspection would in fact cause such a high degree of interference with Merck's business, a credible argument could be
made that compliance would be unreasonable and unduly burdensome and that the GAO's access should therefore be limited in some way. However, to the extent the GAO's demand conforms to the dictates of See v. City of Seattle, Merck
18

At the time the GAO issued its demand for access to Merck's records,
it made identical demands to five other drug companies. Apparently, only
one of the six companies, Hoffman LaRoche, Inc. (Hoffman), voluntarily
acceded to GAO's request. According to Merck, a team of GAO auditors
remained on site at Hoffman from July 1975 to July 1977 without completing the review, and, in July 1977, Hoffman terminated its voluntary participation. Of course, even if Merck's claim as to the Hoffman precedent is
accurate, Merck would have to prove that a GAO review of its records
would require similar or greater disruption.
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should be required to allow the GAO's examination to
proceed.
VI
Reasonable persons may disagree as to the extent of the
access to Merck's cost records that the GAO should be permitted under the facts of this case. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, granted the GAO all the access it wanted. Three
other circuits held that there must be limits, and they have
adopted the "Bristol test." However, no court has given serious consideration to Merck's totally-unfounded contention
that the GAO is not entitled to any of these records whatsoever. This Court should not be the first. As I have said,
there should be some limits, but I would not foreclose the
government entirely.
In due course, I shall convert this memorandum into an appropriate dissent .
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the statutory language - language incorporated into Merck's
contract with the government. No exception is made for
"fixed price contracts", and at best the legislative hi~tory
is ambiguous.
Based on research by my clerk, there does not appear to be any Court of Appeals authority for reading this
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OF THE UNITED STATES AND
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APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
The Court wholeheartedly accepts Merck's contention
that, when the terms and conditions of a government contract "are not expressly tied to the contractor's costs and the
contractor makes no representations regarding its costs during the course of negotiations, none of the contractor's cost
records is subject to inspection by the Comptroller General."
Ante, at 2. Merck's theory has been emphatically rejected
by every Court of Appeals that has considered it, 1 and, in my
'In addition to the opinion below in the present case, 665 F . 2d 1236
(CADC 1981), see SmithKline Corp. v. Staats , 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981),
cert. pending, No. 81-2082; United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F.
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view, we should do likewise, because the result Merck seeks
can be achieved only by distorting the statutory language and
the legislative history. The statutory provisions at issue, 10
U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c), clearly were intended to allow the GAO a reasonable degree of access to contractors' records needed to determine whether prices
charged to the government were excessive. Hence, I
dissent.
I
In each of the four contracts involved here, the United
States agreed to purchase certain pharmaceutical products
from Merck at a fixed price. In each instance, Merck proposed a contract price based on its catalog or "market" price,
and the government contracting officer accepted the proposal
without any "haggling" or other negotiation as to price.
Each of the contracts contains the statutorily-mandated provision allowing the GAO the right to inspect Merck's books
and records that are "directly pertinent" to the contract.
The GAO now seeks to examine those Merck records that
indicate the cost to Merck of the goods sold to the government. The GAO deems such an examination necessary to
carry out its statutory duty to "investigate . . . all matters
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds," and to "make recommendations looking to greater
economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C.
§ 53(a).
denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978); and Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States,
385 F . 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). Apparently
recognizing the untenability of the argument advanced here by Merck, the
pharmaceutical manufacturer in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F.
Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA21980), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), did not even dispute that it was
"obliged by the terms of the contracts to provide access to records of its
manufacturing costs, records which relate to the pricing of the products delivered and records required to verify all data obtained during the course of
the review." 428 F. Supp., at 1389.
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By inspecting Merck's cost records, the GAO hopes to be
able to estimate whether the contract price paid by the government was a fair one. The GAO has confirmed by experience the common-sense observation that the mere "fact that
a product is listed in a manufacturer's catalog and offered to
any customer is no assurance that . . . the standard catalog
price is reasonable." 2 If the GAO's inspection were to reveal that Merck's prices were unreasonably high, the GAO
presumably would recommend to the contracting agencies
that they "negotiate prices more carefully or . . . obtain
greater competition in future similar procurements," 3 or that
they take other action "looking to greater economy or efficiency," 31 U. S. C. § 53(a), in future expenditures.
The Court concludes, however, that, despite the inclusion
of the access-to-records provision in the contracts, the GAO
has no right to inspect Merck's books to determine how much
it cost Merck to produce the products sold to the government. Although the Court's exact rationale for this conclusion is far from clear, 4 it appears to be loosely based upon
2
Hearings on the Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before
the Subcomm. for Special Investigations of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1963) (remarks of Robert Keller, General Counsel of the GAO).
3
Joint App., at 23a (affidavit of Paul Dembling, General Counsel of the
GAO).
• In Part II of its opinion, the Court observes that the phrase "directly
pertinent" refers to the circumstances surrounding the specific contract at
issue, that it limits the GAO's authority by requiring a close connection between the records sought and the underlying contract, and that it indicates
congressional concern for the privacy of contractors. I agree with these
general propositions. In Part III of the opinion, the Court rejects the
GAO's claim of a right to inspect virtually all of Merck's cost records, and I
agree with this conclusion. Then, however, in Part IIID, without any
analysis, the Court makes a logically unsound leap to the conclusion that
because the GAO's claim of a right to inspect all of Merck's cost records is
not sustainable, the general "interpretative principles" indentified in Part
II support a holding that the GAO is not entitled to any cost records
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two premises: first, that, by their very nature, a contractor's
cost records are not "directly pertinent" to a fixed-price contract, unless the government explicitly inquires about costs
during the contractual negotiations; and, second, that the
phrase "directly pertinent" must be very narrowly construed, because Congress passed this legislation for a limited
anti-fraud purpose, with only "incidental" broader aims in
mind. The Court is wrong on both of these points.
II
I begin with the language of the statute. Jackson Transit
Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union,-- U.S.-(1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 568
(1979). The legislation at issue requires unadvertised government contracts to include a clause allowing the GAO to examine any of the contractor's books, documents, papers, or
records "that directly pertain to, and involve transactions relating to, the contract.... " 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b). See 41
U.S. C. §254(c). Nothing in the statutory language excludes records pertaining to fixed-price contracts (in general)
or contracts based on catalog prices (in particular). Nor
does anything in the statutes suggest in any way that the
GAO must suspect fraud or wrongdoing before it can exercise
its right to examine the relevant books and records. Therefore, the GAO's claim of a right of access to Merck's cost
records is valid unless the documents the GAO seeks to inspect are not "directly pertinent" to, or do not "involve transactions relating to," Merck's contracts with the government.
" '[I]t is hard to imagine anything more directly related to a
contract than the cost of producing the items covered by it or
the matters going into the makeup of the price."' Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 913 (CA7), cert. denied, 439
U. S. 959 (1978). Accord, SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668
F. 2d 201, 208-209 (CA3 1981); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
United States, 385 F. 2d 1013, 1016 (CA9 1967), cert. denied,
whatsoever.
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390 U. S. 988 (1968). The Court's argument to the contrary
is based on the proposition that Merck's production costs do
not "directly pertain" to the contract because they were irrelevant to the negotiation of the contract or to a determination
that the contract was performed in accordance with its
terms. The plain language of the access provision, however,
entitles the GAO to records directly pertinent to the contract,
which means all aspects of the contract; the statutory language does not in any way limit the GAO's access to records
directly pertinent to only the contract's negotiation or
performance.
The Court cites nothing in the statutory wording that supports its holding. 5 Its conclusion is founded on the erroneous premise that if the contractor made no representations,
and the government's negotiator made no inquiries, as to the
contractor's production costs, such costs must be considered
to have been and to be irrelevant to the government's decision to enter into the contract. Obviously, however, in instances where the contractual price of an item was unduly
higher than the amount it cost to produce the item, the government most likely would not have agreed to the contract
had it known of this fact. Therefore, even looking at the
statutory language alone, The Court's contention that
Merck's production costs are not directly pertinent to these
contracts is untenable.
III
Even if, contrary to my belief, the statutory language is
6

Indeed, all the Court has to say about the literal statutory wording is
that the phrase "directly pertinent" refers to the circumstances surrounding the contract at issue, and that it limits the GAO's authority by requiring a close connection between the records sought and the underlying contract, ante, at 6, and that the government's interpretation of "directly
pertinent" is inconsistent with the limiting language of the statute and the
policy behind that language. Ante, at 11. One can readily accept all of
these general propositions without concluding, as the Court does, that they
support a holding that the government must be denied access to all of
Merck's cost records.
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somehow regarded as ambiguous, resort to the legislative
history further refutes the Court's view. The legislative history of the access-to-records provisions is relatively brief and
to the point. It demonstrates without the slightest doubt
that Congress intended to allow the GAO authority to examine a contractor's books to evaluate government procurement
techniques by ascertaining whether the government had paid
a reasonable price for the contractor's goods or services, even
in instances where the GAO does not have reason to suspect
that the contractor acted in an improper manner.
The Court states, ante, at 13, that Rep. Hardy, the bill's
sponsor, "regarded the bill primarily as a tool for protecting
the Government from being defrauded in [a] particular transaction," and that he thought the access authority would have
merely "incidental value" in allowing the GAO to detect other
weaknesses in the procurement process. This is patently incorrect. Rep. Hardy clearly indicated that the bill was intended to improve the adequacy of government procurement
techniques in various ways. He expressly remarked:
"The major purposes of this bill are twofold: One, to give
the Comptroller General the proper tools to do the job
the Congress has instructed him to do; and, two, to provide a deterrent to improprieties and wastefulness in the
negotiation of contracts." I d., at 13198. 6
The Court ignores the first of these two "major purposes."
As noted above, Congress has instructed the GAO to "investigate all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and
application of public funds," and to "make recommendations
looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C. §53(a). 7 There is thus no warrant for
' The Court, ante, at 12, n. 12, distorts this quotation by gratuitously
inserting the word "audit" in brackets.
7
In addition, [t]he Comptroller General is authorized and directed to
make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the
Government . . . which . . . will enable Congress to determine whether
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Merck's conclusion that the access-to-records provisions were
not intended to further the GAO's ability to perform these
functions.
Rep. Hardy early explained to his colleagues that normal
procurement procedures called for competitive bidding but
that procurement by negotiation was sometimes necessary.
In the latter context, where there is no competitive bidding
to "operate[] as a brake on the price which a contractor can
demand from the Government," Rep. Hardy saw the need to
establish "every reasonable safeguard against waste and extravagance in the spending" of government funds. 97 Gong.
Rec. 13198 (1951). 8 He felt that, no matter how "conscientious and honest" the government representatives might be,
the contractor's representatives would, in the great majority
of cases, have a tremendous advantage from the standpoint
of both training and experience. Ibid. Thus, there was
"every chance in the world that the Government [would]
come out on the short end of the deal," and Rep. Hardy
deemed it necessary to "at least enable the [GAO] to check
the transaction, both from the Government records and the
contractors' books." Ibid.
Rep. Hardy then gave some factual examples of "typical
situations in which the authority of this bill would play an
effective part." Ibid. One such example was about a contractor who charged the government a great deal higher rate
of overhead than it did its private customers. Another
"vivid example of how the authority would enable the GAO to
do an effective job" involved a
public funds have been economically and efficiently administered and expended. " 31 U. S. C. § 60.
8
In light of Rep. Hardy's repeated admonitions on the need to establish
every reasonable safeguard against waste and extravagance in government
cpending, I find it incredible that the Court concludes, ante , at 12-13, that
Congress thought the access authority would have only "incidental value"
towards avoiding such weaknesses in the procurement process.

J
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"situation where the Government was buying parts from
an automobile dealer who, in turn, was getting them
from a parts distributor who, in turn, was getting them
from a small tool shop. Naturally, the price paid by the
Government included profits upon profits and completely
wasteful administrative and handling costs." Ibid.
The sponsor observed that that it "would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the GAO to detect such a situation without
the right afforded" in the bill. Ibid.
It is apparent from Rep. Hardy's remarks that the bill was
intended to guard against more than fraud and abuse. Contractors employing experienced, well-trained negotiators
could not be accused of wrongdoing simply for "outnegotiating" their government counterparts. The automobile dealer
who sold the parts to the government at retail was not acting
fraudulently. 9 Even the contractor who charged the government more than its private customers could not, without
more, be accused of illegal or unethical conduct. 10 Yet Rep.
Hardy plainly intended that his bill apply in such situations.
After Rep. Hardy finished his opening statement, he answered a number of questions from other Members of the
House. The following exchange ensued:
"Mr. Mills: ... What the gentleman from Virginia
9
This "vivid example of how this authority would enable the GAO to do
an effective job," 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951), which the Court ignores, totally belies the Court's claim, ante, at 14, that its holding will not impede
use of the access provisions to cure the problems explicitly mentioned by
Rep. Hardy in his examples.
0
' The Court, ante, at 14, distorts Rep. Hardy's language and intent in
setting forth this example by implying that Rep. Hardy suggested that his
example involved a contractor who misrepresented his overhead costs to
the government. Although Rep. Hardy's did state that overhead costs
are "supposed to be based upon the experience of the contractor in performing similar work in the past," 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951), Rep. Hardy
in no way suggested in his example that the contractor had made any misrepresentations as to this point.
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and the committee, as I understand, are endeavoring to
do, you are endeavoring to pursue a situation that may
be fraudulent, for example, so that the General Accounting Office might look into that question. . . .
Mr. Hardy: The gentleman is right, with this exception that I think should be clearly understood, that there
are a lot of other situations besides those involving fraud
which might be uncovered.
Mr. Mills: The gentleman from Virginia did not hear
me perhaps. I said an example would be fraud.
Mr. Hardy: That is correct." Id., at 13199 (emphasis
added).
In light of this colloquy, it is quite untenable to assert, as the
Court does, ante, at 13, that it is "not clear" that Congress
was motivated by any purpose broader than that of "protecting the Government from being defrauded in [a] particular
transaction." 11
The debate continued two days later when Rep. Hardy
proposed an amendment that would have allowed agency
heads the discretion to omit the access-to-records clause from
contracts with foreign contractors, id., at 13371, and Rep.
Harvey proposed an amendment that would have exempted
"a manufacturer or processor who is a supplier of material to
a primary contractor and who is not a subcontractor" from
the scope of the bill's coverage. Id., at 13376. Both of
The Court repeatedly draws solace from the undisputed fact that the
primary purpose of the access legislation was to protect the government
against fraud. Ante, e. g., at 12, 13. The Court ignores the fact that we
must give effect to other, subsidiary congressional purposes as well. See
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774-775 (1979); United States v.
Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 377 (1978). Since "the vast majority of the legislative references" do not evidence an intent to restrict use of the access-torecords provisions "to situations involving impropriety," SmithKline v.
Staats, supra, at 205, I think it clear that an important, even if only secondary, purpose of this legislation was to provide the government with a
means to avoid providing its contractors excessive profits.
11
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these proposals were ultimately defeated, but, during the
lively debate on the proposed amendments, several Members
of Congress stated without contradiction that the bill would
allow the GAO extremely broad authority to examine
records. For example, Rep. Harvey asked whether, if the
bill became law, a subcontractor of a primary government
contractor "would be subject to having all his books opened
up for inspection by Government officials." I d., at 13372
(emphasis added). Rep. Hardy replied that it would, unless
the subcontractor only supplied some "casual item" in connection with the performance of the contract. Ibid. Based on
this understanding, Rep. Harvey later argued that his limiting amendment was needed, because otherwise "every manufacturer . . . of . . . goods that eventually find their way into
defense production ... is going to have to supply all the answers to the GAO on everything he manufactures." I d., at
13376. "[E]very section of his books will have to come under
the complete scrutiny of the GAO." Ibid. In response,
Rep. Hardy did not dispute this characterization of the scope
of the GAO's authority, but he nevertheless opposed the Harvey amendment, because it "would make it impossible frequently to obtain information which would be vital in the
study of a contract." Ibid.
Rep. Hoffman, a strong opponent of the bill, several times
during the debate observed that the "GAO under this bill can
go into the books of [contractors] and ask and get from them
anything and everything they want." I d., at 13373. He indicated his belief that the bill would allow the GAO "to snoop
into [a contractor's] books and find out what [the goods or
services] cost[] or what will be a fair price or what profit we
make." Ibid. See also id., at 13375, 13377. Standing
alone, of course, the statements of an opponent of the bill,
such as Rep. Hoffman, would not carry much weight, 12 but
12
See, e. g., National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U. S. 612, 639-640 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
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here, even though all comments pro and con were made in the
midst of a free-wheeling debate, the proponent of the bill,
Rep. Hardy, in no way took issue with Rep. Hoffman's view
of the scope of GAO's authority. Rep. Hardy's essential response was that it was necessary to require contractors to afford the GAO this broad authority, and that Rep. Hoffman's
fears of excessive GAO "snooping" were groundless, because
the GAO would have neither the inclination nor the manpower to examine the records of every individual supplier.
I d., at 13376, 13377.
The original Hardy bill required the inclusion, in negotiated contracts, of a clause allowing the GAO the right to examine any records that were "pertinent" to the contract. At
the very end of the debate, Rep. Hoffman proposed the
amendment that added the word "directly" before the word
"pertinent." I d., at 13377. Rep. Hoffman explained that he
had discussed his amendment with Rep. Hardy, the bill's
sponsor, and that, although the amendment was "not all that
it should be," it was the most that Rep. Hardy would agree
to. Ibid. 13 Rep. Hoffman then stated that the purpose of

u. s. 384, 394 (1951).
In fact, it appears that it was Rep. Hardy, not Rep. Hoffman, who
proposed the language of the amendment that limited the government to
"directly pertinent" records. Rep. Hoffman stated that this language was
"the best he [Rep. Hardy] could think of." 97 Cong. Rec. 13377 (1951).
Apparently what happened is that Rep. Hoffman and Rep. Hardy had a
private meeting, during which Rep. Hoffman suggested the need for a limiting amendment. Rep. Hoffman had stronger language in mind, which
Rep. Hardy refused to accept. Rep. Hardy must have then proposed the
"directly pertinent" language to placate his colleague, and Rep. Hoffman,
though not satisfied, "was rather forced to accept it and to agree with
him." Ibid. Thus, although the Court is correct in stating, ante, at 8,
that the amendment "circumscribe[d] the inquiry the Comptroller General
was authorized to undertake," it is clear that this circumscription was only
to the extent agreeable to Rep. Hardy, who, as shown by his opposition to
the Harvey amendment, clearly would not have agreed to a sharp reduction in the scope of his bill.
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his amendment was "to limit the snooping that may be carried on under this bill which we do not have the votes to defeat." Ibid. At that point, Rep. Hardy remarked that he
had no objection to the amendment, and it was accepted without further discussion. Ibid. 14
In light of Rep. Hardy's consistent position throughout the
debate, it cannot plausibly be argued that he agreed to the
Hoffman amendment with the understanding that it effected
a drastic reduction in the scope of the bill's coverage or purpose. As outlined above, Rep. Hardy continuously spoke of
the need to provide a mechanism to combat waste and extravagance in federal procurement, and he vigorously and
successfully opposed the Harvey amendment, which would
have significantly limited the bill's scope. His acceptance of
the addition of the word "directly" appears to have been
largely a sop to the bill's opponents. The most that can be
said is that Rep. Hardy accepted the amendment to allay concerns that the legislation "would let the GAO go into everybody's business and look it over if they just wanted to take a
look at it .... " Id., at 13373 (Rep. Hoffman). The amendment gave assurance that the bill would not be used as a basis
for inspection of books and records having no substantial connection with government procurement. But the amendment
definitely was not intended to bar the GAO's access to
records legitimately needed to assess the reasonableness of
prices charged to the government, and thereby to protect the
government against waste, excessive prices, and ineffective
procurement. 15
" Immediately after passage of the Hoffman amendment, the House
passed the bill, as amended, 97 Cong. Rec. 13378 (1951). On the following
day, the Senate passed it without any debate whatsoever. Id., at 13411.
5
' Accord, Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F . 2d 1236, 1249 (CADC 1981)
(Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 916 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978); Comment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1157-1158 (1979) ("[t]he court [in Eli Lilly]
correctly rejected Lilly's argument that the insertion of the word 'directly'
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IV
Although, until today, all courts have unequivocally rejected Merck's argument that the GAO may not inspect any
cost records in situations such as the one here, the court
below in the present case, and some other lower courts in
similar cases, 16 have refused to uphold the GAO's claim of a
right of access to all the cost records it wishes to examine,
including some records that are undeniably essential to an accurate determination of whether the government wasted
money by entering into these contracts. Applying the socalled "Bristol test," 17 these courts have limited the GAO's
access to records pertaining to a contractor's
"manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging materials, labor and fringe benefits, quality control and supervision); manufacturing overhead (including plant administration, production planning, warehousing, utilities
and security); royalty expenses; and delivery costs." 18
into the 'directly pertinent' formula sharply narrowed the scope of inquiry
to be allowed the GAO").
In SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201, 210 (CA3 1981), cert.
pending, No. 81-2082, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the government's contention that the Hoffman amendment "meant nothing." The
court therefore adopted the standard formulated in Bristol Laboratories v.
Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), but it did so only
because the government did not suggest any alternative definition of "directly pertinent" records that it wished the court to adopt if it did not agree
with the government's reading of the statute. For an explanation of the
Bristol standard, and my reasons for believing that the Bristol test is not
entirely correct, see part IV, irifra.
16
See SmithKline Corp . v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, No. 81-2082; Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY
1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA21980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451
u. s. 400 (1981).
17
The test was first adopted by the District Court in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, supra.
18
428 F . Supp., at 1389.
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The Bristol test excludes:
"data with respect to research and development, marketing and promotion, distribution and administration
(except to the extent that these areas may be included in
the factors listed above). 19
This test has been described, perhaps inaccurately/0 as being
based on a "direct costs v. indirect costs" or an "allocated
costs v. unallocated costs" dichotomy.
The courts that have adopted this test have no doubt been
influenced by a need to come up with some form of reasonable
limitation on the broad access demand the GAO has made.
The GAO claims it has the right to examine records pertaining to every cost "defrayed from commingled general revenues that include the government's payments under the contract." I agree that the GAO's demand is somewhat
overbroad; the Court correctly observes, ante, at 9, that it
would require Merck to allow inspection of cost records totally unrelated to the government contracts, such as records
of expenditures for raw materials used to manufacture products other than those sold to the government under the contracts. However, I am not convinced that the proper conclusion is to limit the GAO to the records allowable under the
Bristol test.
The Bristol court adopted its standard solely on the basis
of the cost records that the contractor was willing to disclose
to the GAO. The court felt that the contractor's offer "reflected a responsible and reasonable effort to distinguish 'directly pertinent' matter within the meaning of the access to
records clause." 21 The court thus accepted the contractor's
contention that the cost records it was not willing to disclose
19

I d., at 1389-1390.
The Bristol court itself stated that the costs records held examinable
under its test are "by no means ... limit[ed]" to direct costs. !d., at 1391.
21
Ibid.
20

81-1273

AND

81-1472-DISSENT

BOWSHER v. MERCK &'CO.

15

had "only the most general relation, if any, to the prices
charged." 22
Although cost records having, at most, only an insubstantial relation to the price charged are not "directly pertinent"
to the contract, it is apparent that many of the records
deemed unexaminable under Bristol relate to costs that may
have had a critical bearing on the prices charged, and that
would be of central importance to a GAO inquiry into the fairness of these prices. In the pharmaceutical industry, it has
been estimated that "direct" or "allocated" costs comprise
only about nine per cent of the sale price of individual products. The so-called "indirect" or "unallocated" costs-primarily research and development, advertising and other promotion, general administrative expenses, taxes, and profitare much larger and economically more significant. 23 Yet,
under the Bristol test, the GAO is denied access to all
. records in this category, thus making it impossible for the
GAO to make an accurate assessment of the fairness of the
prices and thus the adequacy of the government's procurement technique. 24
In my view, the correct rule in a case of this nature is that
any books or records that bear directly on the question
"'Id., at 1390.

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, supra, at 913; Merck & Co. v. Staats, supra,
at 1247 (Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reekie, Price
and Quality Competition in the United States Drug Industry, 26 J. Indus.
Econ. 223, 235 (1978); Rucker, Public Policy Considerations in the Pricing
of Prescription Drugs in the United States, 4 Int'l J. Health Services 171,
173 (1974).
24
For example, the Bristol test does not allow the GAO to examine a
contractor's records of advertising costs. One would imagine that, if the
GAO were aware that a great percentage of the cost of the products of a
certain company went to support a large advertising campaign, rather
than, say, to maintain quality control, the GAO might recommend to the
contracting agency that it not deal with that company in the future. Yet,
under the Bristol test, the GAO would not be able to obtain the information
needed to make such a recommendation.
23
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whether the government paid a fair price for the goods or
services it purchased are "directly pertinent" to the contract
of purchase. Under this test, for example, the cost records
of an advertising campaign to promote the particular products sold to the governments, or a research project designed
specifically to develop or improve these products, would
clearly be "directly pertinent." On the other hand, records
of advertising campaigns and research projects involving
only unrelated products would lack the requisite degree of
pertinence. Of course, in many instances a commercial advertisement or a research project will be designed to promote
or develop both products sold to the government and other,
unrelated products. With respect to cost records of efforts
such as these, there might be some close questions as to
whether such records are "directly pertinent" to the government contracts. If, however, the GAO could bear the burden of proving that the records are of costs that likely had a
direct and substantial impact on the price charged to the government under the contract, I would allow the GAO access to
the records.

v

The inquiry does not necessarily come to an end once the
GAO establishes that it has a statutory and contractual right
to inspect particular records. In addition to the statutory
"directly pertinent" limitation, the GAO's right of inspection
is further circumscribed by constitutional standards, such as
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement.
Where, as here, the GAO wishes to see a contractor's
records and the contractor declines to accede voluntarily to a
GAO request, the GAO must issue an administrative subpoena. If the contractor refuses to comply with the subpoena, the GAO must apply to a District Court for enforcement of the subpoena. 31 U. S. C. § 54(c) (Supp. V 1981). 25
25

The GAO has had this subpoena power only since 1980. See Pub. L.
96-226 § 102(c), 94 Stat. 312 (Apr. 3, 1980) (codified as 31 U. S. C. § 54( c)).
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Once in the District Court, a contractor such as Merck has
the benefit of all of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence limiting the bounds of an agency's right to demand the
production of a private entity's records.
Essentially, in assessing an agency's application for enforcement of an administrative subpoena, we have insisted
that the agency's demand be reasonable. The general rule is
that "when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate
books or records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the
subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose,
and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unduly
burdensome." See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 544
(1967). See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632,
652-653 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U. S. 186, 208 (1946); 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 4:15 (2d ed. 1978). This standard is a flexible one
that takes into account the extent to which the public interest
will be served if the subpoena is enforced. See v. City of Seattle, supra, at 545.
In the present case, Merck has claimed that compliance
with the GAO's demand would entail substantial expense and
disruption of its operations. This claim is based on evidence
that the proposed GAO inspection would require Merck to allow an entire team of GAO auditors to remain on site at
Merck for over two years. 26 This, of course, is a matter for
Prior to 1980, the GAO could only sue for specific performance of its contractual right of access. See, e. g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States,
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). The GAO
can still opt in favor of this latter, slower course, but the government does
not make any claim that its rights in a specific performance action would be
any different from those in an action for judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena. See Oral Arg. Trans., at 29-30.
26
At the time the GAO issued its demand for access to Merck's records,
it made identical demands to five other drug companies. Apparently, only
one of the six companies, Hoffman LaRoche, Inc. (Hoffman), voluntarily
acceded to GAO's request. According to Merck, a team of GAO auditors
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first-instance determination by the District Court, but, if the
inspection would in fact cause such a high degree of interference with Merck's business, a credible argument could be
made that compliance would be unreasonable and unduly burdensome, and that the GAO's access should therefore be limited in some way.
VI
Reasonable persons can disagree as to the extent of the access to a contractor's cost records that the GAO should be
permitted in a case such as this. For example, two Courts of
Appeals have granted the GAO all the access it wanted. 27
Three other Courts of Appeals have held that there must be
limits, and they have adopted the Bristol test. 28 JUSTICE
BRENNAN and JUSTICE REHNQUIST today indicate that they
would do likewise. Ante, at--. Until today, however, no
appellate court29 has accepted the totally-unfounded contention that the GAO is not entitled to any of these records
whatsoever. I agree that there must be appropriate limits,
but the government should not be foreclosed entirely.
In view of the foregoing, I would remand these cases to the
District Court, with instructions to uphold the GAO's request
for access to Merck's "direct" and "indirect" cost records, but
remained on site at Hoffman from July 1975 to July 1977 without completing the review, and, in July 1977, Hoffman terminated its voluntary participation. Of course, even if Merck's claim as to the Hoffman precedent is
accurate, Merck would have to prove that a GAO review of its records
would require similar or greater disruption.
Z7 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, supra; United States v.
Abbott Laboratories, supra; and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, supra.
28
In addition to the opinion below in the present case, 665 F. 2d 1236
(CADC 1981), see SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, supra; and Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, supra.
29
I might also note that, with one exception, see Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Staats, supra, every District Court in the cases cited in notes 19 and 20,
supra, was similarly unreceptive to the claim that the GAO was not enti-

tled to any cost records whatsoever.
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only to the extent that: 1) the records sought by GAO likely
had a direct and substantial impact on the prices charged to
the government under the contracts; and 2) the request is
reasonable in scope and would not unduly burden Merck. To
the extent the GAO's demand conforms to these statutory
and constitutional standards, Merck should be required to allow the GAO's examination to proceed. 30

30
The holding I would adopt comports with the Court's "two guideposts"
for interpretation of the access authority. Ante, at 8. First, it would protect contractors from unwarranted "broad-ranging governmental intrusion
into their business affairs," and, second, it would ensure that the requested
records have a "close connection" to the government contracts. More importantly, it would give effect to the "third guidepost" identified by JusTICE REHNQUIST, ante, at 2 n. 1, but neglected by the Court, "that the
GAO is to be able to inspect records to fulfill its statutory responsibility."
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five votes.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 81-1273

AND

81-1472

CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

81-1273

v.
MERCK & CO., INC.
MERCK & CO., INC., PETITIONER

81-1472

v.

CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES AND
UNITED STATES
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before the Court is the scope of the authority of
the Comptroller General of the United States to examine the
records of a private contractor with whom the Government
has entered into fixed-price 1 negotiated contracts. We con1
A pure fixed-price contract requires the contractor to furnish the goods
or services for a fixed amount of compensation regardless of the costs of
performance, thereby placing the risk of incurring unforeseen costs of performance on the contractor rather than the Government. See 1 R. Nash
and J. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 413 (3d ed. 1977). Variations on
the pure fixed-price contract may contain some formula or technique for
adjusting the contract price to account for unforeseen cost elements. See
id., at 413-415 (discussing fixed-price contract with escalation clause,
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elude that, under the circumstances presented in this action,
the Comptroller General may inspect the contractor's records
of direct costs, but not records of indirect costs.
I

In 1973 Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") entered into three
contracts with the Defense Supply Agency of the Department of Defense and one contract with the Veterans Administration for the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Government. All four contracts were negotiated, rather than
awarded after formal advertising. 2 The pharmaceutical
products supplied under each contract were standard commercial products sold by Merck in substantial quantities to
the general public. App. 41a. The price term proposed by
Merck for each contract was based on the catalog price at
which Merck sold the item to the general public or was otherwise determined by adequate competition. Before the
award of each of the contracts at the fixed-price proposed by
Merck, there was no actual negotiation of price, and the government contracting officers did not request Merck to submit
cost data in connection with any of the four contracts.
As required by 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C.
§254(c), 3 each contract contained a standard access-tofixed-price incentive contract, and fixed-price redeterminable contract).
' The Government employs two methods of procurement: advertised
procurement, i. e., formal solicitation of competitive bids, and procurement by negotiation. A negotiated contract is the method authorized by
statute for use in situations in which the formal advertising and bidding
procedure is deemed impractical or unnecessary. See 10 U. S. C.
§ 2304(a); 41 U. S. C. § 252(c). In procuring by negotiation, the government agency discusses the terms of the procurement with one or more contractors and awards the contract to the party offering the terms most
advantageous to the Government.
3
10 U. S. C. § 2313(b), which applies to the Defense Supply Agency contracts, provides:
"Except as provided in subsection (c), each contract negotiated under
this chapter shall provide that the Comptroller General and his represent-
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records clause granting the Comptroller General the right to
examine any directly pertinent records involving transactions related to the contract. Relying on these clauses, in
August 1974 the Comptroller General issued a formal demand
to Merck for access to the following:
"all books, documents, papers, and other records directly pertinent to the contracts, which include, but are
not limited to (1) records of experienced costs of direct
materials, direct labor, overhead, and other pertinent
corporate costs, (2) support for prices charged to the
Government, and (3) such other information as may be
necessary for use to review the reasonableness of the
contract prices and the adequacy of the protection afforded the Government's interests." App. 18a. 4
atives are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final payment,
to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or
any of his subcontractors, that directly pertain to and involve transactions
relating to, the contract or subcontract."
The Veterans Administration contract is governed by 41 U. S. C. § 254(c),
which provides in pertinent part:
"All contracts negotiated without advertising shall include a clause to the
effect that the Comptroller General of the United States ... shall until the
expiration of three years after final payment have access to and the right to
examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of
the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of
and involving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts."
Despite the slight difference in wording, there is no substantive difference
between the defense and civilian procurement statutes.
• The Comptroller General issued identical demands to five other
pharmaceutical companies. These access-to-records demands apparently
were the product of congressional interest in competition and profits in the
pharmaceutical industry generally.
As early as 1971, Sen. Gaylord Nelson suggested during hearings on
competition in the drug industry that the Comptroller General invoke his
access-to-records authority "to take a look" at the costs incurred by
pharmaceutical companies. Hearings on Competitive Problems in the
Drug Industry Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8020 (1971).
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Merck refused to comply with the Comptroller General's request and commenced this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Comptroller General's access demand
exceeded his statutory authority. 5 The United States intervened and counterclaimed to enforce the Comptroller General's demand.
The District Court granted partial summary judgment for
each party. Rejecting Merck's argument that cost records
are not "directly pertinent" to the fixed-price contracts that
Following those hearings, Sen. Nelson's staff continued to urge the General Accounting Office (GAO) to use the access provisions to obtain cost
records "without any strings attached so that the high profits could be publicized by product and firm." App. 144a; id., at 142a-148a. See also
Hearings, supra, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 8537, 8581-8583 (1972).
Finally in June 1973, the GAO responded by proposing a two-phase
study of the economics of the pharmaceutical industry to be accomplished
through voluntary participation by drug companies. Merck and five other
companies agreed to cooperate in the first phase, which contemplated gathering background data on the industry. In April1974, the GAO issued a
proposal for the second phase of the study, aimed at developing data on
"salient economic and operational aspects of the industry." App. 141a.
Merck expressed its concern over participating in this phase without adequate assurance of the confidentiality of the cost data it might be requested
to supply.
Initially the GAO agreed that the data regarding individual companies
and individual drug products should remain confidential and anonymous.
Id., at 150a. Senators Nelson and Kennedy and their staffs, however, reiterated that the subcommittee's objectives could be served only by publication of the data. Ibid. The Comptroller General's formal demand letters to the six companies that had participated voluntarily in the Phase I
study followed.
5
Four of the remaining five pharmaceutical companies that received demand letters also challenged the Comptroller General's request. See
SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos.
81-2082, 81-2268; Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Staats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980) (per curiam), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981); United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F.
2d 672 (CA7 1979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904 (CA7), cert.
denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978).
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were the predicate of the GAO demand, the court permitted
access to all records
"directly pertaining to the pricing and cost of producing
items furnished by . . . Merck under the . . . contracts
. . . , including manufacturing costs (including raw and
packaging materials, labor and fringe benefits, quality
control and supervision), manufacturing overhead (including plant administration, production · planning,
warehousing, utilities and security), royalty expenses,
and delivery costs." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
81-1273, p. 39a.
The court barred access, however, to records "with respect
to research and development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration." · I d., at 40a. In a brief per
curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 665 F. 2d 1236 (1981).
Both parties sought certiorari. In No. 81-1273, the
United States petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals'
determination that records of Merck's indirect costs are not
subject to examination by the Comptroller General. In No.
81-1472, Merck challenges the determination that records of
its direct costs are "directly pertinent" to the contracts in
question and are therefore subject to examination. Merck
also contends that access to its cost records is barred because
the Comptroller General's access demand was not made for a
congressionally authorized purpose. We granted .certiorari
on the petitions of both parties,-- U. S. - - (1982), and
now affirm.
II
As with any issue of statutory construction, 6 we " 'must begin with the language of the statute itself.'" Bread Political
• The parties agree that the scope.of the Comptroller General's authority
under the access-to-records clauses in the four contracts turns on the
meaning of the statutory language, rather than on the intention of the parties to the contract. We also emphasize at the outset that Merck does not
challenge the authority of Congress to impose, as a condition.of doing busi-
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Action Committee v. FEC, 455 U. S. 577, - - (1982), quoting Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S.
176, 187 (1980). The focal point of controversy is the meaning of the statutory phrases "directly pertinent to the contract" and "involving transactions relating to the contract."
It is plain from the face of the provisions that these are words
of limitation designed to restrict the class of records to which
access is permitted by requiring some close connection between the type of records sought and the particular contract.
The legislative history of the access provisions underscores
what the language reflects: the intention of Congress to limit
to some degree the Comptroller General's aecess powers.
As originally introduced, the bill now codified as 10 U. S. C.
§ 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c) provided access to "pertinent" records "involving transactions related to" the contract. See 97 Gong. Rec. 13371 (1951). 7 Rep. Hoffman opness with the Government, a requirement that contractors disclose all of
their cost records to the Comptroller General, regardless of the pertinence
of these records to the particular contract. Rather, Merck bases its arguments on its interpretation of the statutory language.
7
This bill was modeled on, and as originally proposed was identical to, a
January 1951 amendment to the First War Powers Act of 1941. See Act
of January 12, 1951, 64 Stat. 1257. That amendment was a piece of emergency legislation adopted in response to the crisis conditions created by the
Korean War. Because of severe wartime inflation, many defense contractors holding fixed-priced contracts could not meet their obligations. To ale
leviate the problem, Congress gave President Truman emergency authority to renegotiate government contracts. See H. R. Rep. No. 3227, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1950). The access-to-records provisions were included in order to deter fraud and profiteering in the renegotiation process.
96 Cong. Rec. 17123 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("The amendment will
give power to the General Accounting Office to go into the books and delve
into the records of these contractors who have been relieved to determine
whether or not there is fraud or overreaching or whether they have done
anything untoward.").
Although the initial access-to-records legislation in the January 1951
amendments was of limited duration, Congress shortly thereafter passed
the permanent version at issue here. Rep. Hardy, the sponsor of both the
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posed the original bill on the ground that it permitted
"unnecessary snooping expeditions" and allowed the GAO to
"go into everybody's business and look it over if they just
wanted to take a look at it." I d., at 13373. He therefore
offered a floor amendment to insert the word "directly" before the word "pertinent," stating that the purpose of the
amendment "is to limit the 'snooping' that may be carried on
under this bill." I d., at 13377. The sponsor of the original
bill, Rep. Hardy, did not oppose the amendment, and the
amendment passed without debate or discussion.
The passage of the Hoffman amendment clearly reveals
that Congress did not want unrestricted "snooping" by the
Comptroller General into the business records of a private
contractor. The Government nevertheless attempts to discount the significance of Congress' addition of the word "directly." Based on the lack of opposition to the limiting
amendment by the bill's sponsor and the lack of debate, the
Government argues that the Hoffman modification did not
significantly alter the scope of the Hardy bill. We cannot
agree. The only explanation in the legislative history of the
meaning and purpose of the amendment is that of Rep. Hoffman. His statement, which, as the explanation of the sponsor of the language, is an "authoritative guide to the statute's
construction," North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456
U. S. 512, - - (1982), expressly indicates that the intent of
the amendment was to curtail the scope of investigation authorized under the bill. Although, as the Government emphasizes, Rep. Hoffman did not have the votes to defeat the
temporary and permanent access-to-records provisions, learned that government procurement officers were negotiating contract modifications
under two permanent procurement statutes that lacked access provisions,
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949. "In order to plug this loophole,"
Rep. Hardy introduced the bill to require inclusion of access-to-records
clauses in contracts negotiated under these statutes. 97 Cong. Rec. 13198
(1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy).
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bill in its entirety, he nevertheless had the votes to circumscribe the inquiry that the Comptroller General was authorized to undertake. Moreover, to accept the Government's
contention that the amendment had no substantive effect
would contradict the settled principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every word of the
statute. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De
La Cuesta, 458 U. S. - - , - - (1982). Therefore, in our
attempt to give meaning to the words "directly pertinent,"
we must be mindful of Congress' aim to protect contractors
from broad-ranging governmental intrusion into their private
business affairs.
It does not follow, however, that our interpretation of the
language added by the Hoffman amendment must be guided
solely by that policy, for it is expressive of only one of the
aims embraced by Congress in enacting the access-to-records
provisions. The legislative history also reveals that Congress sought, in granting the GAO this access authority, to
equip that agency with a tool to detect fraud, waste, inefficiency, and extravagance in government contracting generally. Rep. Hardy, the sponsor of the legislation, explained
that the two major purposes of the bill were "to give the
Comptroller General the tools to do the job the Congress has
instructed him to do . . . and . . . to provide a deterrent to
improprieties and wastefulness in the negotiation of contracts." 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951). With regard to the
former purpose, it is clear that Congress envisioned use of
the access authority as an adjunct to the Comptroller General's statutory responsibility to "investigate ... all matters
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds" and to "make recommendations looking to greater
economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C.
§53(a). See also 31 U. S. C. § §60, 65(a). 8 Obviously,
8
Rep. Hardy further explained the inspiration for the bill. Because of
the absence of competitive safeguards when the Government procures by
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broad access to cost records would enhance the GAO's ability
to evaluate the reasonableness of the price charged the Government and to identify areas of waste and inefficiency in
procurement.
Because of the lack of debate or discussion of the Hoffman
amendment, however, we do not have any indication in the
legislative history, nor indeed in the language of the statute
itself, of the parameters of the area of access authority left to
the GAO after the restrictive words were added to the bill.
In defining the degree of limitation, we thus traverse uncharted seas guided only by the two general statutory purposes reflected in the legislative history. Consequently, our
task in construing the statutes as they apply in this action is
to give effect to both of these congressional aims. The tension between these goals is apparent. For some industries
and some types of contracts, including perhaps those at issue
here, neither objective can be achieved fully without sacrificing the other. 9 Given these dual, conflicting aims, we must
negotiation rather than by formal solicitation of bids, Rep. Hardy identified a need to establish "every reasonable safeguard against waste and extravagance in the spending of" government funds in the context of negotiated contracts. 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951). By permitting the GAO "to
check the transaction both from the Government records and the contractors' books," the bill would ensure that the Government did not "come out
on the short end of the deal." Ibid. Rep. Hardy then cited a number of
"typical situations in which the authority of this bill would play an effective
part." Ibid. One example dealt with detection of an inefficient market
structure under which, because the Government was purchasing automotive parts from a dealer who in turn bought from a middleman, the Government was paying a price that included "profits upon profits and completely
wasteful administrative and handling costs." Ibid.
Thus, contrary to Merck's assertion, the 1951 access statutes were designed to detect more than fraud and abuse in the negotiation of procurement contracts. Rep. Hardy himself remarked that GAO review under
the access provisions would disclose "a lot of other situations besides those
involving fraud." Id., at 13199.
9
It is possible that the 1951 Congress was aware of this tension. The
addition of the Hoffman amendment was a clear compromise. Rep. Hoff-
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balance the public interest served by full GAO investigations
against the private interest in freedom from officious governmental intermeddling in the contractor's private business
affairs.

III
A
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals erred
man had adamantly opposed the Hardy bill from the outset because of the
breadth of authority it would give to the GAO. The amendment he offered
emerged from a discussion between Rep. Hardy and Rep. Hoffman and
represented the extent of the limitation upon GAO's access authority that
Rep. Hardy would accept. See 97 Cong. Rec. 13377 (1951) (remarks of
Rep. Hoffman).
It does not follow, as JUSTICE WHITE assumes, post, at--, from the
fact that the Hoffman amendment was a compromise that the restrictive
language is to be given no effect at all. In dissent, JusTICE WHITE refers
to the Hoffman amendment as "largely a sop to the bill's opponents."
Post, at - - . The legislative record, however, tells us that a majority
voted for the Hoffman amendment, and we must give weight to the expressed will of a legislative majority. JUSTICE WHITE also interprets the
Hoffman amendment "as an assurance that the bill would not be used as a
basis for inspection of books and records having no substantial connection
with government procurement." Post, at - - . Notwithstanding this
recognition of the amendment's purpose, however, JUSTICE WHITE adopts
a construction of "directly pertinent" that completely eviscerates the limiting purpose of the Hoffman amendment, for he would allow the GAO access
to any records helpful in determining the amount of profit being made by
the contractor. See post, at--. Thus, under the guise of "interpretation" of the statute, JUSTICE WHITE has "construed" the statute so broadly
as to give it a reading indistinguishable in effect from the bills to expand
the GAO's access authority that were rejected by Congress in the 1970's.
See note 11, infra. Such an approach therefore bespeaks legislation,
rather than interpretation.
Recognizing the extreme encroachment upon the privacy of a contractor's business records which his interpretation of the statutes would permit, JUSTICE WHITE attempts to bring "balance" and "reason" to bear on
the situation by invoking court's powers under Fourth Amendment principles to limit the GAO's right of access. Post, at--. If, however, Congress had intended the GAO demands to be limited only by the Fourth
Amendment, it need not have concerned itself with requiring that records
be directly pertinent to the contract.
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in holding that records of Merck's indirect costs 10 are not "directly pertinent" to the contracts in question. In so arguing,
the Government maintains that Merck's indirect costs are directly pertinent to the fixed-price contracts because Merck
uses payments made by the Government under these contracts to defray indirect expenses. Thus, the Government
would have us define as "directly pertinent" the records of
any costs defrayed from commingled general revenues that
include government payments under the contract.
We cannot accept this interpretation of the statute, however, for it completely eviscerates the congressional goal of
protecting the privacy of the contractor's business records.
Under the Government's proposed definition, records of expenditures to purchase raw materials for the manufacture of
an entirely different product than that sold under the government contract or to invest in the stock of another corporation
would be subject to inspection by the Comptroller General.
Hence, the Government's interpretation would permit farranging governmental scrutiny of a contractor's business
records of nongovernmental transactions completely unrelated to either the contract underlying the access demand or
the product procured under that contract. Indeed, carried
to its logical extreme, the argument would dictate that few, if
any, of a private contractor's business records would be immune from GAO scrutiny. In short, the Government's proposed definition of the statutory language admits of no doctrinal limitation, effectively reading the Hoffman limiting
language and its "anti-snooping" policy out of the statute.
B

Nor are we persuaded by the Government's argument that
the GAO's consistent and longstanding interpretation of its
10
By indirect costs we mean costs incurred in the areas of research and
development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration,
which are not directly attributable to a particular product.
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authority under the access-to-records statutes supports the
view that indirect cost records are subject to examination
under the fixed-price contracts in question here. Even if
that interpretation could be characterized as consistent, it
would not be entitled to deference, for, as we have noted
above, it is inconsistent with the statutory language. See
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397,
411 (1979).
Moreover, to characterize the GAO's current sweeping
view of its access authority as "consistent" would be generous. There is significant evidence indicating that in the past
the GAO itself has acknowledged a deficiency in its statutory
authority to examine indirect cost records. 11 For example,
It is significant to note that the profit study of the defense industry,
which Congress authorized as part of the Military Appropriations Act of
1970, Pub. L. 91-121, § 408, 83 Stat. 204, is the only occasion on which Congress has deliberately granted the GAO the kind of broad-ranging authority it asserts here. In conferring this authority, Congress, wary of equipping the GAO to conduct a "fishing expedition," 115 Cong. Rec. 25795
(1969) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff), carefully limited such authority to "only a
single study." !d., at 25793 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
Although not conclusive with respect to interpretation of the 1951 access
statutes, subsequent c·ongressional rebuffs of GAO requests for expansion
of its access authority are instructive both with regard to the GAO's view
of the limits of the 1951 legislation and Congress' apparent reluctance to
broaden that legislation. For example, a Senate bill introduced in 1973
directed that "the Comptroller General ... shall ... have access for the
purpose of audit and examination to any books, documents, papers and
records ... which in the opinion of . .. the Comptroller General may be
related or pertinent to the ... contracts ... [or] subcontracts." S. 2049,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (emphasis added). Another Senate bill which,
like S. 2049 never emerged from committee, would have granted the
Comptroller General authority to undertake a study of profits made on
government and commercial contracts by contractors having government
contracts aggregating $1 million or more. To enable the Comptroller General to make such studies, the bill gave him the authority to demand from
the contractor "such information maintained in the normal course of business . . . as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropri11
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in a ruling of particular significance for the facts of this case,
the Comptroller General determined in 1967 that the access
provisions do not confer upon the GAO the right to examine
records relating to a contractor's nongovernmental business,
even when such review is necessary to determine whether a
catalog-priced item was actually sold in substantial quantities
to the general public. App. 162a-163a. Moreover, in late
1969, the GAO prepared a memorandum for Congress in connection with congressional consideration of a proposed grant
of additional access authority to the GAO to pursue a study of
contractor profits in the defense industry. In the memorandum, the GAO informed Congress that its authority under
the 1951 access provisions did not extend to review of records
of a contractor's nongovernmental business and that additional access authority was therefore necessary to conduct a
profit study. 115 Cong. Rec. 25800-25801 (1969) (reprinting
GAO Memorandum on the Adequacy of the Legal Authority
of the Comptroller General to Conduct a Comprehensive
Study of Profitability in Defense Contracting). Finally, a
1970 internal memorandum also reveals the GAO's belief that
amendment of the 1951 access statutes would be necessary to
give it the power to examine records of indirect costs. App.
160a-161a. 12
The only statements by the GAO directly supportive of its
position here occur in testimony before a congressional subcommittee in 1963 regarding the GAO's litigation of the scope
ate. " S. 3014, 93d Cong. , 2d Sess. (1974). See also S. 2268, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
12
We observe that JuSTICE WHITE's dissent makes no attempt at all to
deal with this evidence of the GAO's own view of the limits of its access
authority. Given the GAO's historic position, excepting of course its position in the Hewlett-Packard case and the current litigation, see infra, contractors like Merck who entered into fixed-price negotiated contracts with
the Government had no reason to expect that consenting to inclusion of the
access-to-records clause would subject their businesses to the kind of
broad-ranging inquiry which JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent approves.
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of its access authority in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United
States, 385 F. 2d 1013 (CA91967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988
(1968). 13 In light of the GAO's litigation posture during these
hearings, as well as the contrary expressions of GAO opinion
noted above, this testimony cannot provide persuasive evidence of the GAO's consistent interpretation or practice.
IV
To summarize, the Government has failed to offer a definition of "directly pertinent" that would give any effect to the
limiting purpose of that language. In our view, the appropriate accommodation of the competing goals reflected in the
13

Hewlett-Packard, like this case, involved a request by the Comptroller
General to review cost records of a contractor who entered into fixed-price
negotiated contracts. During that litigation, a congressional subcommittee commenced hearings to investigate "the need for, or desirability of,
recommending legislative action" in light of Hewlett-Packard's refusal to
permit inspection of its cost records under the access provisions. Hearings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). During the course of these hearings, Robert Keller, General Counsel of the GAO, testified concerning the
GAO's position with respect to the Hewlett-Packard situation.
"It is our position that the contract clause and the statute give us the
right to examine the cost records of the contractor and other pertinent data
that relates [sic] to items included in the contract, in sufficient completeness and detail to permit us to determine the reasonableness of the negotiated prices." ld., at 10.
Mr. Keller further stated that the GAO could "go beyond direct manufacturing costs" into such areas as "how research costs are allocated as between the Government contract and commercial business." Id., at 23.
In legislative hearings in 1965, which in part addressed "the extent of the
GAO's right to examine contractor books and records," Hearings on Comptroller General Reports to Congress on Audits of Defense Contracts Before
the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), the Comptroller General again referred to his position in the Hewlett-Packard case, which was
still pending in the courts, regarding the proper interpretation of the access provisions. Id., at 45.
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legislative history counsels us to draw the line precisely
where both lower courts have drawn it. Thus, under the
four fixed-price contracts in question, the Comptroller General should be permitted access to records of direct costs 14
but barred from inspecting records of indirect costs.
Direct costs certainly pertain directly to even a fixed-price
contract, for direct costs are, by definition, readily identifiable as attributable to the specific product supplied under the
contract. Consequently, as a rational businessman, the contractor will have some regard for these costs in setting even a
catalog price in order to avoid a loss on the product. Because these costs therefore have a very direct influence on
the price charged the Government, the GAO would need to
examine records of these costs to determine whether the contractor is making an excessively high profit or the Government is getting a "fair deal" under the contract. Presumably, indirect costs also influence in some manner the setting
of a catalog price, although to what extent is unclear, given
the somewhat arbitary accounting allocations that must be
made to determine what portion of indirect costs may be attributed to a specific product. Nevertheless, the degree of
intrusion into the contractor's private business affairs
ocassioned by GAO scrutiny of indirect cost records is far
greater, particularly where pure fixed-price contracts are involved. Such an inspection would entail exposure to the
GAO of many of the contractor's nongovernmental transactions. 16 We therefore conclude that the appropriate balance
Direct costs would include direct manufacturing and overhead costs incurred in producing the specific drug items procured under the four
contracts.
16
By contrast, where the contract that serves as the predicate for the
GAO's access demand is cost-based-as in a cost-plus contract-the contractor is in no position to complain of the intrusiveness of GAO inspection
of indirect cost records. By claiming from the Government full reimbursement for these costs under the cost-based contract, the contractor represents that these costs are justified as attributable to the performance of the
14
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of public and private interests in this situation weighs in
favor of access to direct cost records but against access to
Merck's indirect cost records. 16 Our decision in this regard is
in accord with that of the majority of the courts of appeals to
have considered this issue. 17
The Government objects strenuously that barring such access impermissibly constrains the GAO in its efforts to improve the procurement process. In an industry in which indirect costs represent such a large proportion of total costs, 18
access to records of those costs is critical to an understanding
of the industry with which the Government is dealing and to
an assessment of the fairness of the contract price and the advisability of continued adherence to the negotiated procurement methods employed under those contracts. 19
government contract, and not to any nongovernmental transactions.
Therefore, the public interest served by permitting the GAO to inspect
records supporting these claims clearly outweighs any privacy interests
the contractor possesses in those records.
16
JUSTICE WHITE suggests that, when indirect cost records relate both
to governmental and nongovernmental transactions, the GAO should be
permitted access to the records of any indirect costs that it can prove had a
direct and substantial impact on the price charged to the Government
under the contract. Post, at--. This approach is unworkable for both
the Government and contractors. To decide these "close questions" of direct pertinence, the parties to the fixed-price contract may be forced toresort to the courts. Bright line rules upon which the parties' expectations
may be firmly established are preferable to the protracted litigation that
JUSTICE WHITE's suggestion would engender.
17
In addition to the decision below, see SmithKline v. Staats, 668 F. 2d
210 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos. 81-2082, 81-2268, and Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA21980) (per
curiam), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981). See also
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968) (permitting access to records of direct production costs, including direct material, direct labor, and overhead costs).
18
The Government suggests that direct costs may represent as little as
9% of the sales price of a pharmaceutical product. Brief for Petitioners in
No. 81-1273, p. 34.
19
We observe, however, that the Government has conceded in this action
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There is no doubt that our holding wiil impede the GAO to
some extent in the fulfillment of its statutory responsibilities. 20 As we have already noted, however, in adopting the
Hoffman amendment, Congress was apparently willing to
forego the benefits that might be gained from permitting the
GAO broad access to the contractor's business records in
order to protect those contractors from far-reaching governmental scrutiny of their nongovernmental affairs. By inclusion of that language, Congress injected into the determination of which records are accessible considerations besides
the Government's need for the information. Thus, any
impediment that our holding places in the path of the GAO's
power to investigate fully government contracts is one that
Congress chose to adopt, and any arguments that this situation should be changed must be addressed to Congress, not
the courts. 21

v

We address briefly Merck's contention that there is yet another independent ground upon which the Comptroller Genthat it has no reason to suspect that Merck has engaged in any fraud or
impropriety in connection with the negotiation or performance of these
contracts. App. 41a-44a, 76a. Nor does the Government have any reason to believe that the prices charged under these contracts were unreasonable in any way. !d., at 42a, 76a. In fact, the price under each of the
contracts was the lowest price at which Merck sold each of the products to
anyone at the time the contracts were awarded. !d., at 26a, 42a.
20
The extent of that burden is, however, unclear. In fact, in testimony
before Congress the Comptroller General candidly expressed doubts about
the usefulness of access to records of indirect costs in the pharmaceutical
industry, suggesting that the attempt to determine from these records the
portion of indirect costs allocable to individual drug products would be "a
waste of time." Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry
Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on
Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 8578 (1972).
·
21
The GAO's own recognition of this dilemma has prompted it, as outlined in note 11 supra, to seek expanded access authority from Congress.
Its efforts for expansion are more appropriately directed to that forum.
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eral should be denied access to any of its cost records.
Merck argues that the GAO is not entitled to examine these
records because the access demand was not made for a congressionally authorized purpose. Specifically, Merck contends that the access-to-records statutes do not permit the
Comptroller General to request records for the purpose of either conducting an economic study of the pharmaceutical industry or securing information desired by individual members of Congress.
Much of what we have already said provides an answer to
this contention. The legislative history reveals that Congress granted the GAO authority to examine directly pertinent records under individual procurement contracts in order
to assess the reasonableness of the prices paid by the Government and to detect inefficiency and wastefulness. Given this
authorized purpose, there is no reason to conclude that the
GAO may not compile the information that it may lawfully
obtain, within the statutory limits outlined above, from an investigation of individual contracts in order to arrive at a picture of the pharmaceutical industry generally. 22 Moreover,
the fact that two senators encouraged the GAO to use its lawful authority to the fullest extent possible is irrelevant. The
GAO is an independent agency within the legislative branch
that exists in large part to serve the needs of Congress. If
the records sought by the GAO are within the scope of the
The record indicates that compilation of information lawfully obtainable
under its access authority is what the GAO intended to accomplish. One
GAO official explained: "[l]f we were to use our right of access under specified Federal contracts, we would attempt, insofar as possible, to present a
report similar t o that which we had proposed to present under the April
1974 proposal [for the second phase of the economic study of the pharmaceutical industry]." App. 154a-155a (emphasis added). GAO officials
also recognized that the statutory restrictions on its access authority would
necessitate some changes in the approach contemplated under the prior
two-phase study based on the voluntary participation of the pharmaceutical
companies. Ibid.
22
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access-to-records provisions, the fact that the Comptroller
General's request had its origin in the requests of congressmen or that the GAO reported the data to Congress does not
vitiate its authority.
VI
Because of the GAO's mandate to detect fraud, waste, inefficiency, and extravagance through full audits of government contracts, we cannot accept Merck's view that the only
records directly pertinent to the four fixed-price contracts at
issue are those necessary to verify that Merck actually had an
established catalog price for the item procured, that it sold
the items in substantial quantities to the general public at the
catalog price, that it delivered the product specified, and that
it received from the Government no more than the amount
due under the contract. On the other hand, given the policy
of protecting the privacy of contractors' business records also
expressed in the statutory language and legislative history,
neither can we accept the Government's contention that it
must be permitted access to all of Merck's cost records. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.

It is so ordered.
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81-1273 ann 81-1472 Merck & Co . Cases

Dear Sandra:
Although I will be happy to join your alternative
draft of March 8, it may be desirable to state expressly
that we agree with the holding of the District Court that
access is barred "with respect to research and development,
marketing and promotion, cHstributi.on, ann administration ..
costs, except to the extent such data fairly may be included
in costs directly related to the particular contract. I
think this is a corr~ct reading of the DC opinion and order .
See Pet. for rert., pp. 39a-40a.
I a1so suggest omission of the first full sentence
on page 17. If this Court says that "our holding will impeoe the GAO • • • ", the GAO may think \-Te are suggPstinq it
should ask Congress to amPnd the statute. I would hesitate
to invite changes in the statute .

You are to be commended on accomplishing what I
think is a sound revision in a remarkably short period of
time.
Sincerely ,
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Dear Sandra:
I joined your first circulation of February 17. Having
read your revised position in your circulation of March 8, I
have concluded, as of now, to ramain with my original vote,
that is, to affirm in part and to reverse in part. Thus, if
you obtain a Court for your revised opinion, as I believe
you will, I shall be in partial dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference
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No. 81-1273, Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc.
No. 81-1472, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Bowsher

Dear Lewis,
I appreciate your thoughts on the alternative draft and
plan to accommodate both requests in the next draft.
With respect to your suggestion that we include the
District Court's language, I plan to revise the language at
the top of page 15 of the opinion as follows:
"Thus,
under
the
four
fixed-price
contracts
in
question, the Comptroller General should be permitted
access to records of direct costs.
He should be
barred, however, from inspecting records of costs
incurred in the areas of research and development,
marketing
and
promotion,
distribution,
and
administration, except to the extent the contractor has
allocated these costs as attributable to the particular
contract."
To be consistent, I will also plan to add the "except"
language used by the District Court to the quotation of the
District Court language on page 5 of the opinion.
That
sentence would then read:
"The court barred access, however, to records 'with
respect to research and development, marketing and
promotion, distribution, and administration (except to
the extent such data may be included in the cost items
listed above).'"
I will also add to the definition of direct costs in
footnote 14 a cross reference to the District Court's
definition of direct costs quoted on page 5 of the opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
It appears that the second version of
the draft opinion will have a court. Accordingly,
I will withdraw the original version which I
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